On 3 May 1858, the Roorkee Field Force left Moradabad. Despite the searing heat, Brigadier John Jones was determined that his men would march the last 50 miles to the gates of Bareilly. Communication with Sir Colin had been sketchy at best: Jones knew Campbell was on the march; his spies had told him as much. According to the last information he received, Campbell had left Shajahanpore. The entire venture was fraught with uncertainty, but Jones, an army veteran and hardly a stranger to impromptu plans, was determined to be before Bareilly as ordered. On the morning of 5 May, Jones was exactly on the opposite side of Bareilly, but he was still 21 miles away at Meraganj. He had with him:

6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers)
60th King’s Royal Rifles
1st Punjab Rifles
17th Punjab Infantry
Multani Horse
Detachments of 1st Punjab Cavalry, 1st Sikh Infantry,
No. 7 Field Battery 1/1 Bengal Artillery (Captain A.G. Austen)
4/4 Bengal Artillery and detachments of the 1/4 , 3/4 Bengal Artillery with
two 18-pounders
two 8-inch howitzers
two 8-inch mortars
two 5 1/2-inch mortars
and 5/1 Bengal Horse Artillery (Lt. G.A. Renny)

Jones knew what Campbell planned to do and that any action he took would be in support of Campbell’s plans; however, while the battle raged in Bareilly, Jones was still too far away to provide that decisive blow that Campbell had intended. Jones should have been in a position to take the city; instead, he was nowhere near it. However, that did not mean there was nothing for him to do. The rebels were not fools — they were perfectly aware that Jones was marching down from Moradabad and had taken measures to make his final leg to Bareilly as unpleasant as possible. At Meraganj, they had placed a strong picquet, well entrenched and ready to give him a warm welcome.

The problem was that the men manning the picquet were not quite as convinced of their success as their leaders. They were positively discomfited when Jones, realising his only way to Bareilly was effectively blocked by what he regarded as something of an insolent entrenchment, decided to open the day’s affair with artillery. They watched with some trepidation as he placed four guns of No. 7 Light Field Battery on the right of their position with a support of a squadron of the Dragoons and the Afghan Horse; in the centre of the road were his heavy guns, with the 1st Sikhs taking the right and 60th on the left, supported by the 17th Punjabis. Further to the left of the 60th stood the 1st Punjab Rifles. He then ordered the advance. The men in the entrenchment were not cowards, but this was certainly more than they could manage, and their only option was to flee. They abandoned the entrenchment as swiftly as Jones passed through it and retreated over the Doojra River to their rear, dragging along their guns along with them. Jones followed them down to the river, where he saw their intention was not to stand and fight him on this side, but to take their guns to the other side of the river, putting a reasonable distance between themselves and him. For Jones, the challenge now was to prevent the rebels from positioning their guns on the other bank.
Jones ordered the cavalry and artillery on the right to pass in quick order around the village and come down on the rebel flank. With Captain Andrew Smith leading, the cavalry swept down on the rebels and caused a momentary havoc, by slaying as many as came within arms reach, but at the river, Smith suddenly pulled up. He had no way of getting his three guns across the river, and behind him, the rebels had formed up their own cavalry and, without any ceremony, opened fire on Smith with their artillery. In all haste, Captain Austin, who had realised just what a pickle they were in, had wasted no time in turning his guns and replied, as rapidly as he could, with shrapnel, something so unexpectedly destructive, it gave the rebels a moment’s pause. It was their undoing for at the moment, the Dragoons swept down on them, “disconcerted” the cavalry who turned and fled, leaving the rebel guns unprotected. The gunners abandoned their guns and Smith claimed them for his own. The tale, however, as told by Captain Smith in his report is somewhat less clinical.

“I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of Brigadier-General J. Jones, C. B., Commanding the Roorkee Field Force, that on the 5th instant, agreeably to orders, I followed in pursuit of the retreating enemy from the -village of Meergunge, with the Affghan Horse and Coke’s Rissalah, the latter under Lieutenant R. F. Angelo, 1st Punjaub Infantry; strength together about 150.
During the pursuit, several fugitive horsemen were overtaken and immediately cut down. After about 3 miles’ chase, we came upon a horsed gun which had been abandoned by the flying enemy; having secured it, we had advanced but a short distance in continuance of the pursuit, when the rebels opened on us with grape and round shot. Observing that their fire swept down the road, I made a movement to the right, intending to charge their left flank; as, however, there was a very large force of cavalry in support of their position, and as my men had become much scattered, owing to the rapidity of the pursuit, I deemed it necessary to wait till I should get a larger body collected
The enemy perceived our flank movement, and kept turning their guns on us, thus removing their fire from the road, and leaving it clear for advance of the artillery of the advanced guard, which now came up, and taking up their position on our left, opened fire.
During our gradual movement to the right, we were under a heavy fire as the enemy had our range exactly. My own horse was killed under me by a round shot, as was also that of a Sowar, and some were wounded with grape.
As soon as our artillery ceased firing, we gal¬ loped forward, and got possession of 2 more guns, cutting down the few men who were just abandoning them, and continued the pursuit as far as the nullah at Dojoora. Here observing the enemy assembled, about 700 strong, on the opposite bank, and most of our own party being very much behind, owing to the length of the pursuit and rapidity of the rebels’ flight, I drew up in a tope on this side to get my men together, deeming that I carried out the orders I received in capturing the 3 guns, which were all the enemy were reported to have possessed. I should consider the enemy’s loss to be about 60 killed.”

Jones had the satisfaction of watching the rebels with their well-mounted cavalry and their inconvenienced general on his fine elephant repeat with some rapidity towards Bareilly. Jones crossed the river and called a halt for the day.