The Second Campaign
The Nepalese had been defeated in both Garhwal and Kumaon. Ochterlony pushed his advantage to outmanoeuvre Bada Kaji Amar Singh Thapa who had commanded the army against Rollo Gillespie. As the only commander who had any success in this costly war, Hastings nominated Octherlony Main Operational Commander in the second offensive against the Bharatpur-Makawanpur- Harihapur front; to give him a little more encouragement, 17’000 Bengal sepoys were deployed to make his already formidable army look just that bit more persuasive. He would attack various fronts, including Upardang Gadhi, Sinchyang Gadhi, Kandrang Gadhi, Makawanpur Gadhi, and Hariharpur Gadhi. and he opened operations with a very dangerous move.
In February 1816, Ochterlony opted for a rarely used mountain pass. A failure in this endeavour could have spelt disaster for the British forces, but a successful crossing would enable them to launch a direct attack on the rear of the Nepalese troops. Colonel Kelly and Colonel O’Hollorah navigated along the Bagmati River to reach Hariharpur Gadhi, where they managed to bribe some local leaders for crucial intelligence regarding the defensive positions in the area. This information significantly weakened the Nepalese defences. Even if the British could only send a battalion through secret routes, it would have given them a strategic advantage. However, they were able to advance with the strength of more than the strength of a brigade. On February 29, Colonel Kelly and Colonel O’Hollorah initiated their assault from two different directions. After a fierce battle, the Nepalese forces were pushed back from Hariharpur Gadhi. Kaji Ranjore Singh Thapa retreated to Sindhuli Gadhi to regroup with Bada Kaji Amar Singh Thapa. By the end of March 1816, the British troops chose not to pursue Sindhuli Gadhi and instead fell back to Makawanpur as Octherlony had settled down to ratify the Treaty of Sugauli.
The Treaty of Sugauli
The war ended with the Treaty of Saugauli in which Nepal lost one-third of the territory to the British. Nepal ceded all of Sikkim, which encompassed Darjeeling, along with the territories of Kumaon, Garhwal, and the Western Terai. The Mechi River was established as the new eastern border, while the Mahakali River delineated the western boundary of the kingdom. To offset the loss of revenue from the Terai region, the British East India Company agreed to provide an annual compensation of 200,000 rupees. The British did not intend to undermine the existence or autonomy of a state that served as a strategic buffer between them and the Chinese territories. Lord Hastings abandoned his plans to fragment Nepal due to concerns about provoking China, of which Nepal was theoretically a vassal. In 1815, while British forces were engaged in campaigns in western Nepal, a senior Manchu official led a substantial military contingent from China towards Lhasa. The subsequent year, following the signing of the Anglo-Nepalese treaty, the Chinese army advanced southward to Nepal’s borders. This incited panic among the Nepalese, who were still haunted by the memories of the Chinese invasion in 1792, prompting a surge of urgent diplomatic efforts. Hastings reassured the imperial authorities and instructed the newly arrived British Resident in Kathmandu to prepare for immediate departure should the Chinese invade once more. As such, Nepal reverted to its isolationist policies. Initially, there was concern regarding the presence of a British Resident, but this apprehension ultimately proved to be unfounded, as the rulers of Nepal effectively managed to confine the Resident to a state akin to house arrest. Conversely, the Terai region presented significant challenges for British governance, leading to the return of some territories to the kingdom in 1816, along with the cessation of annual payments. Despite the conclusion of the Anglo-Nepalese War, the border disputes between the two entities remained unresolved. The demarcation of the boundary between Nepal and Oudh was not finalized until 1830, and discussions regarding the border between Nepal and British territories continued for several years thereafter.
Although Hastings had ultimately won the Anglo-Nepalese War, the cost of it was enormous. When the books were seen to, he had cost the EICo Sicca rupees 5,156,961 (1 silver sicca, or new rupee, was fixed at approximately 15 siccas to one gold mohur of 11.66 grams, from the Calcutta mint. The rupee was set to the gold standard, and in 1816, a bill was passed to regulate the standard unit of currency and confirmed the valuation of one standard ounce of gold (11/12 fine) at £.3.17.10½. It is little wonder the government was unhappy. To put it bluntly, Hastings’s foray against Nepal had cost them more than the combined campaigns against the Maratha and the Pindaris which came in at a hefty Sicca Rs. 3,753,789. The promises of increased trade, especially in wool from Western Tibet, never materialised as the EICo was reluctant to annoy the Chinese and risk another expensive war. As such, even with greater access to wool in their newly acquired territories, the market was already monopolised by traders from Kashmir and Ladhak, and the only person they considered trading with was Maharaja Ranjit Singh, someone else the EICo was not going to risk offending. The only lasting reward for the British was the recruitment of Gurkhas to their army, which is explored further in The Hills of Kumaon.
Sources:
Fraser, James Baillie. Journal of a Tour through Part of the Snowy Range of the Himālā Mountains, and to the Sources of the Rivers Jumna and Ganges. London: Rodwell and Martin, 1820.
Malleson, G. B., ed. Kaye’s and Malleson’s History of the Indian Mutiny of 1857-8. Vol. 4. London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1889.
Military Sketches of the Goorka War in India: In the Years 1814, 1815, 1816. London: Printed by J. Loder for R. Hunter, 1822.
Prinsep, Henry Thoby. History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of the Marquess of Hastings, 1813–1823. Vol. 1. London: Kingsbury, Parbury & Allen, 1825.
Rose, Leo E. “China and the Anglo-Nepal War: 1814-1816.” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 24 (1961): 208–16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44140753.
Mutiny Reflections 
