And the War Begins Badly

The Battle of Nalapani

The Battle of Nalapani marked the beginning of the Anglo-Nepalese War, around the Nalapani fort, located near Dehradun, where British forces laid siege from October 31 to November 30, 1814. The fort was defended by Captain Balbhadra Kunwar, while Major-General Rollo Gillespie, a veteran of the Battle of Java, led the British. It was also the last time Gillespie would lead an army – he was killed on the first day of the siege.

Despite being heavily outnumbered and outgunned, Balbhadra and his 600 defenders, which included women, managed to withstand the assault of over 5,000 British soldiers for a month. Fraser described the situation as such:
The determined resolution of the small party which held this small post for more than a month, against so comparatively large a force, must surely wring admiration from every voice, especially when the horrors of the latter portion of this time are considered; the dismal spectacle of their slaughtered comrades, the sufferings of their women and children thus immured with themselves, and the hopelessness of relief, which destroyed any other motive for their obstinate defence they made, than that resulting from a high sense of duty, supported by unsubdued courage. This, and a generous spirit of courtesy towards their enemy, certainly marked the character of the garrison of Kalunga, during the period of its siege. Whatever the nature of the Gurkhas may have been found in other quarters, there was here no cruelty to wounded or to prisoners; no poisoned arrows were used; no wells or waters were poisoned; no rancorous spirit of revenge seemed to animate them: they fought us in fair conflict, like men; and, in intervals of actual combat, showed us a liberal courtesy worthy of a more enlightened people. So far from insulting the bodies of the dead and wounded, they permitted them to lie untouched, till carried away; and none were stripped, as is too universally the case.”

Two further and very costly attempts to take the fort by a direct attack failed and the British were forced to change their tactics. Instead of attacking at all, they cut off the fort’s outer water supply to force Balbhadra to surrender. After three days Balbhadra obstinately still refused to come to terms and, rallying the last 70 men of his garrison, he fought his way out of the fort, and charged the British; the survivors escaped to the hills.
This was not what Hastings had envisioned and Nalapani had given him a moment’s thought. Instead of detaching a part of this division to occupy Garhwal, he instructed Colonel Mawbey to leave a portion of his men at Kalsi in the extreme northwest of the Doon Valley, under Colonel Carpenter and lead the division through the Keree Pass.Considerable reinforcements were pushed onwards and Major General Marindale arrived to replace Mawbey. He was then to move with the rest towards Nahan and take on Ranajor Singh Thapa and his 2300 strong Gurkha army.

The Battle of Jaithak

Major General Martindale took Nahan on 27 December and began his attack on Jaithak Fort and it was little surprise it ended in disaster. Martindale then decided to play the Nalapani trick and cut off the water supply but he had not taken into consideration his men were exhausted and he was running out of ammunition. Martindale gave up and withdrew. The one day battle had cost him over 300 dead and wounded; an utterly demoralised Martindale would fall into a six week sulk, refusing to take any further action against the Nepalese.

Things were to go from bad to worse for the British. Major General Marley had been tasked taking Hetauda, capture the fortresses of Hariharpur and Makawanpur before continuing his advance on Kathmandu. With his division reinforced he set off with 12’000 men but it was all for nought. Marley proved to be over-cautious in his dealings with the Nepalese who confronted him such determination, he managed to only engage them in several minor skirmishes. Major General Wood displayed the same caution and would ultimately retreat.

As For the Nepalese

As for the Nepalese, it was not exactly going according to plan either. They were hopelessly overextended to the west, with Kumaon, their main communication link with their far western positions, undermanned with just over 1500 men to defend the entire province. They had no reinforcements left to call on as province after province had been stripped of men to fight on an increasingly longer line. The British for their part, brought 4500 to the field and outmanoeuvred the small Nepalese force with relative ease, forcing them to abandon one post after the next. However, the Nepalese did manage to take Captain Hearsey captive who had been sent on a flanking move through Eastern Kumaon, but despite their victory, they could not stop the advance of the British. The same terrain that had proved such an obstacle to the British was now proving a hindrance to the Nepalese – four companies were sent from Kathmandu to assist beleagured Kumaon, but the slow passage through the hills would leave them arriving so late, they would be unable to provide any help at all. For reinforcements all Kumaon could rely upon was a company of Gurkhas sent up with Hasti Dal Shah from Almora. In the meantime, Hastings had sent Colonel Nicolls, QMG for the troops in India to take over the Almora campaign – he also threw a further 2000 troops into the fray to augment the irregulars already operating in the area.
Hasti Dal Shah, along with around five hundred soldiers from the Nepalese Army, departed from Almora to secure the northern communication route to Kathmandu. Unfortunately, this group was intercepted, and Hasti Dal Shah, the most skilled commander in the area, was killed almost immediately in the skirmish. The Nepalese faced devastating losses, and when the news of this calamity reached the defenders in Almora, they were left in shock. The British forces began to tighten their grip on Almora, and the Nepalese were unable to halt their advance. On April 25, 1815, 2,000 British regulars led by Colonel Nicholls, along with irregular troops under Colonel Gardiner, launched an assault and took control of the heights surrounding Almora. The British then positioned their artillery just seventy yards from the fort’s gate, effectively demolishing the fort’s walls at close range. Bam Shah ultimately surrendered Almora on April 27, 1815. This British triumph led to the surrender of the Kumaon province and all its fortifications.

Second Battle of Malaun and Jaithak

The only man we have not looked at yet is Major-General David Ochterlony. Unlike his compatriots, Octherlony intended to see this through to the end. His first objective was to cut the Nepalese lines of communication between Central Nepal and the Far West. He started at Malaun. His army was reinforced sizeably and he now had 10’000 men and as many heavy guns as he could get. With this he advanced on Malaun.
Kazi Amar Singh Thapa at Malaun was in something of a disadvantage. His food supplies had to come from the lowlands and the very nature of the terrain forced him to spread out his men very thinly indeed to cover every possible vantage point. Ochterlony’s first move then was to cut off his food supply from Bilsapur and then proceeded to batter Thapa’s network of defenses. With enough manpower and guns at his call, Octherlony could attack and overwhelm several of these at once, driving a wedge between the thinly spread Nepalese.

He started his operations at a point on the ridge and then proceeded in slow but determined moves to take one position at a time. Simultaneously, his sappers constructed makeshift roads to enable Octherlony to move his heavy guns. It was not long before he had reached Deothal, barely 1000 yards from Thapa’s position fort at Malaun.

Overwhelmed but not defeated, the valiant old warrior Bhakti Thapa led assault after assault on Ochterlony’s position; he was killed in the last while trying to capture a gun, still unable to drive the persistant Octherlony even a foot back. It did cost Octherlony 100 men in killed and wounded and the majority of his officers were either dead or wounded. Thapa’s courage impressed Ochterlony so much he returned his body after the last battle with covered in a woolen shawl and a military escort.

Kazi Amar Singh Thapa and Ranajor Singh Thapa found themselves cornered, facing the British artillery when Bam Shah’s letter arrived, revealing the capture of Almora. While the seasoned commander hesitated to give up, Kazi Amar Singh Thapa ultimately recognized the futility of their predicament. Pressured by the circumstances and the British firepower, he chose to surrender honourably for both himself and Ranajor Singh. As a result, the Nepalese stronghold in the Far West fell to the British on May 15, 1815. The British now proposed signing a treaty but they only gave them a month to comply. However, this proved impossible and the Nepalese could not meet the terms, giving Hastings the perfect excuse to launch his second campaign. So hostilities resumed in 1816.
Colonel Bhaktawar Singh Thapa, served as the Sector Commander for defensive operations in the region stretching from Bijayapur to Sindhuli Gadhi during the first campaign. In the subsequent campaign, Bada Kaji Amar Singh Thapa was assigned as the Sector Commander for Sindhuli Gadhi and the eastern front. Colonel Bhaktawar Singh Thapa operated from his headquarters at Makwanpur Gadhi.