The Anglo-Nepalese War, 1814-1816

When the Kathmandu Durbar sought the views of Nepalese leaders regarding a potential conflict with the British, Amar Singh Thapa was not the only one expressing dissent. He asserted that “They will not rest satisfied without establishing their own power and authority, and will unite with the hill rajas, whom we have dispossessed. We have hitherto but hunted deer; if we engage in this war, we must prepare to fight tigers,” and Thapa opposed the strategies implemented in Butwal and Sheeoraj, which he claimed stemmed from the self-serving interests of individuals willing to plunge the nation into war for their own greed. This perspective was in stark contrast to that of Bhimsen Thapa, the Prime Minister of Nepal, who proclaimed, “… our hills and fastness are formed by the hand of God, and are impregnable.” This assertion from Bhimsen Thapa was not unexpected, as Amar Singh suggested, given that Bhimsen Thapa had orchestrated the usurpations in Butwal and Sheeoraj, benefiting his family significantly.

The British Divisions

The initial plan of the British was to attack on two fronts across the frontier, which stretched from the Sutlej River to the Koshi, an area covering more than 1500 miles. From the east, Major-General Bennet Marley and Major-General John Sullivan Wood led their columns across the Terai towards the Kathmandu Valley. From the west, came Major-General Rollo Gillespie and Colonel David Octherlony. Facing them was the army of Amar Singh Thapa. From around October, the British began moving their troops towards four depots, where the army was then formed into four divisions, namely, Benares, Dinapore, Meerut and Ludhiana. The Commander-in-Chief of the British forces was Hastings. The majority of fighting men were Indian sepoys and only Ochterlony’s division had no European troops. The British felt they were well-prepared. Captain Knox had conducted surveys of Nepal, collecting information about its internal and external defences and Hastings was confident he could take the Nepalese army with a swift fell swoop.

Marley, with the 1st Division from Dinapore, had 8000 men at his disposal, including 907 of the H.M’s 24th Regiment of Foot and an artillery train of four 18-pounders, eight 6-and 3-pounders and 14 mortars and howitzers. If his plan was to work, Marley needed to seize the Makwanpur Pass and then push onwards to the Kathmandu Valley.
Wood, leading the 2nd Division from Benares with 4500 men, including 950 of H.M.’s 17th Regiment of Foot and his artillery of seven 6 and 3-pounders, four mortars and howitzers, was to move on Gorakhpur and then ascend the hills at the Bhootnuill Pass, turn east straight into the hill districts and form a junction with Marley. If successful, Wood would be able to divide Thapa’s army into two factions thus cutting off his troops from Kumaon and Garhwal from all communication with Kathmandu.
Gillespie, leading the 3rd Division from Meerut was to march his 3’513 men including the H.M.’s 53rd Regiment of Foot to Dehra Dun, destroy the Nepalese forts along the way and then move towards Srinagar, wrestle it from Thapa; if this was not practicable, he could first move eastwards, take Nahan – the chief town in the Simaur District – then sweep on towards the Sutlej River to cut off Ranjor Singh Thapa (the son of Amar Singh, and then presiding over the government in Nahan) to force him to come to terms.
Octherlony with the 4th Division was assembled at Ludhiana. The plan was to move forward against the extensive network of posts occupied by Amar Singh and his troops at and around Arki, a significant town in Kahlur. The intention was to work alongside Major-General Gillespie’s forces, who were advancing through the hills. Once these positions were taken, the goal was to encircle Amar Singh and push him towards that army. The contingent was made up entirely of native infantry and artillery, totalling 5,993 soldiers. They were equipped with a convoy that included two 18-pounder cannons, ten 6-pounders, and four mortars and howitzers.
Beyond the Koshi River to the east, Major Latter was provided with a force of two thousand men, which included his district battalion, to protect the Poornea frontier. He was instructed to establish communication with the Raja of Sikkim and to offer him all possible support and encouragement to drive the Gorkhas out of the eastern hills, without actually deploying troops for that purpose. Captain Barré Latter was dispatched to the Poornea border, and after successfully limiting the Gorkhas to their own lands, he finalized the Anglo-Sikkimese Treaty of Titalia, which affirmed the Raja’s territories, although he did lose some land extending to the Tamur River.

The British had no experience fighting in the unfamiliar hill terrain was completely new to them.

“The general military character of the country is that of extreme difficulty. Immediately at the front of the hills, the plain is covered with the Great Saul Forest, for an average width of ten or twelve miles; the masses of the mountains are immense, their sides steep, and covered with impenetrable jungle. The trenches in these ridges are generally water-courses and rather chasms or gulfs than anything that deserves the name of a valley. The roads are very insecure, and invariably pathways over mountains, or the beds of rivers, the usual means of transport throughout the country being by hill porters. Notwithstanding this general description, spaces comparatively open and hollow, and elevated tracts of tolerably level land, are to be met with, but so completely detached as to contribute but little to facilitate intercourse. One of the largest and most fertile of these constitutes the valley of Nepal Proper. To the westward of Nepal, there is a difficult tract, till the country again opens in the valley of Gorkah, the original possession of the present dynasty. – Westward of this the country is again difficult, till it somewhat improves in the district of Kemaoon. Further to the westward lies the valley of the Dhoon, and the territory of Sue-na-Ghur…” (Hastings)

The Prime Minister of Nepal recognized that the Nepalese possessed several advantages over the British, including familiarity with the terrain and recent combat experience in mountainous regions. However, the British held numerical superiority and possessed far more advanced weaponry. Meanwhile, the Governor-General mistakenly believed that “the difficulties of mountain warfare were greater on the defensive side than on that of a well-conducted offensive operation…” and Rollo Gillespie viewed the Nepalese as a significant challenge to British dominance, stating, “Opinion is everything in such a country as India: and whenever the natives shall begin to lose their reverence for the English arms, our superiority in other respects will quickly sink into contempt.” What Gillespie failed to take into consideration was, that he would be facing Nepalese.