Why Not Delhi?

The question was, why did Barnard simply not push on and take the city on the very same day as urged by some of his officers? What he lacked most on 8 June, besides firepower, was men. He only had the force that remained after Badli-ki-Serai. This was hardly sufficient to attack a fortified city of some 7000 inhabitants, who might or might not be well-intentioned and a mutinous force of unknown quantity. Barnard, and indeed no one else, could say for sure how many mutineers, fanatics and rebels were behind the red sandstone walls of the city. Over time, the number has been greatly exaggerated, with some estimates as high as 50’000! However, it must be taken into consideration that this was the beginning of the mutiny and not the end. By the end of June, the rebel force consisted nominally of:

3rd Bengal Light Cavalry; 4th Bengal Irregular Cavalry
5th, 9th, 11th,20th, 38th, 44th, 45th, 67th and 74th BNI
No.3 Company, 7th Battalion with No.5 Field Battery, Bengal Artillery
6th Bengal Light Cavalry (some elements)
10th Bengal Light Cavalry (some elements)
15th, 23rd and 60th BNI
Four companies of Bengal Sappers and Miners

Many of the rebellious regiments had not reached Delhi, while others simply would not march to Delhi. A more sensible figure of 7500 has been offered (Christopher Hibbert, The Great Mutiny, India 1857), but seeing as the Delhi Field Force numbered no more than 3,600 on the 8th of June, the success of an all-out attack on the city, although not impossible, would not have been met with any success without strong leadership. Barnard could not provide it with the advisors he had, so the British instead dug their heels in on the Ridge. Although it is called the Siege of Delhi, the besiegers were, in fact, the besieged. While General Barnard might have gained the city on 8 June, he would never have been able to hold it for the Delhi Field Force that was now holding the Ridge consisted of the men who had fought at Badli-ki-Serai:

HM’s 9th Lancers, under Lt.Col. Robert Yule, 450 men
Raja of Jhind’s Cavalry under Lt. William Hodson, 50 men
Tomb’s Troop 2nd Troop, 1st Brigade, Bengal Horse Artillery, four 6-pounders, under Major Harry Tombs
Turners Troop, 3rd Troop, 3rd Brigade, Bengal Horse Artillery, five 9-pounders, one 12/24-pounder howitzer under Major Frank Turner
6th Dragoon Guards, 10 men under Lt.Col. William Custance
1st Brigade, 2nd Bengal Fusiliers under Brigadier St.George Daniel Showers
HM’s 75th Regiment of Foot, nine companies- 800 men – under Lt. Col. Charles Herbert, 800 men
1st Bengal Fusiliers- 800 men – under Col. John Welchman
HM’s 60th Rifles, six companies – 500 men – under Lt.Col. John Jones
2nd Bengal Fusiliers, five companies – 450 men – under Captain Alexander Boyd
One wing of the Sirmoor Gurkha Battalion – 400 men – under Major Charles Ried.

Artillery:
2nd Troop, 3rd Brigade, Bengal Horse Artillery under Major E.K. Money and Major Turner, five 9-pounders, and one howitzer
3rd Company, 3rd Battalion, No. 14 Horse Field Battery, Bengal Artillery under Major E.W. Scott, with one 9-pounder, two divisions with only four guns
Kaye’s Heavy Field Battery consisting of two 18-pounders and two 8-inch howitzers, manned by elements of No.4 Company, 6th Battalion, Bengal Artillery and a detachment of artillery recruits.

They were nominally reinforced by:
The Corps of Guides:
Three troops of Guides Cavalry under Lt. Quintin Battye
Six companies of Guides Infantry, in all six British officers and 600 men.
1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Bengal Horse Artillery – 350 Europeans, 500 Sikhs and six guns, including four 6-pounders, under Major Henry Olpherts
One division of the 5th (Native) Troop, 1st Brigade, Bengal Horse Artillery under Lt. George Renny, with two 6-pounders
1 company HM 75th Regiment of Foot
2nd Punjab Cavalry under Lt. Charles Nicholson
4th Sikh Local Infantry, “Rothney’s Sikhs” – under Capt. Octavius Rothney

The Ridge would only have, until the 14th of August, five heavy guns, two of which had come up from Meerut and three that had been captured by the 75th at Badli-ki-Serai. For these, after the first day on the Ridge, servants were paid to bring the Artillery the round shot fired by the enemy to be reused and fired back at them. The going rate was eight annas (one shilling) for every 24 or 18-pounder and four annas or sixpence for every 9 or 6-pounder. This was hardly an army large enough to hold a city as large as Delhi – and it was one of the instances in the history of the mutiny that doing less was better than doing more.

After the Battle

Badli-ki-Serai had exposed the rebel weaknesses, the most damaging of which was their lack of competent leaders. Their officers, though able soldiers, were not gifted generals; they had not deployed any forces to protect against outflanking manoeuvres and had failed to keep men in reserve. They had plenty of cavalry at their disposal, and yet they never used it. They neglected to destroy a bridge on the western Jumna Canal about 800 yards to their left, a fatal mistake. While their left was protected by the Jamuna Canal, and their right was protected by a jheel (lake): from this point to the river there was an open space of some five miles, which the sepoys neglected to protect with their cavalry. Had they done so, Colonel Graves could not have outflanked them from the east.
The sepoys numbered roughly 4000 to 6000 men and were holding a position, approximately 600 yards wide, at Badli-ki Serai. Their left and right flanks were turned as they had not guarded them with cavalry and had not taken the British plan of attack into consideration until it was too late.
The British forces implemented a three-pronged attack – a frontal attack by Sowers and the first column, Colonel Grant turned their left flank, and Colonel Graves turned their right. As a sage historian pointed out, “At Leuthen, the Prussians, with 35,000 men, defeated 60,000 Austrians because they turned their flank. Once an army is outflanked, its numerical superiority is nullified since only part of its manpower is facing the enemy.” Besides this, the British simply fought better than the mutineers. They were well-led and had the fire of the fight in them. Their enemy, though numerically superior, was led by old men, none younger than 50, who had never held an independent command or led anything larger than a company in their lives, no matter how long they had served with the ECIo’s army. The sepoys, although they had taken up a strong position and fought with bravery, showed no inclination to manoeuvre in the field. They had allowed themselves to be outflanked and enfiladed by the British horse artillery. Ultimately, the sepoys lost the battle and the Ridge and retreated in disorder. The Delhi Field Force had won their first decisive victory against the mutineers – what commenced now would be called the Siege of Delhi; however, who was besieging whom would soon become painfully clear. The British had reached the city, but by no means was it captured.