The 52nd Mutiny

The 52nd could not save the Raja – the spectacle of his death and that of his son, hasty and indeed unnecessary at such a volatile time in Jabalpur, had forced the men in Jabalpur to make a decision. Realising what the implications of the execution might have on the minds of the men, Colonel Jamieson and other officers of the regiment proceeded almost immediately afterwards to the lines and explained, as best they could, that the Raja and his son had paid the penalty for proved misconduct. The officers felt they had done enough with this little speech and left the lines, thinking they had done enough to allay any apprehensions the men may have, but they were wrong.
At 9 o’clock that very night, on 18 September, the entire 52nd regiment marched quietly out of Jabalpur, without noise or alarm, until all that was left of the regiment was one native officer and 15 sepoys. The rest had decamped with their muskets and the ammunition in the pouches and had marched by circuitous route outside the city, some 20 miles to the Tahsildari of Patan. As there had been some idea that the 52nd might mutiny, two officers had been sent with detachments out on the great Deccan road and were clueless as to what had occurred in Jabalpur. Likewise, Lieutenant Francis Macgregor, who had but recently been sent with a detachment to Patan, had no idea what had happened – it must have been a surprise when the entire regiment suddenly appeared at his post. Before Macgregor could react, he found himself a hostage of the 52nd BNI.

The Indian officers then wrote a letter to Colonel Jamieson, which is transcribed below and makes for a heartfelt but somewhat threatening reading.

“To His Excellency the Lord of Clemency, the Bountiful of the Age, His Excellency Colonel Sahib Bahadur.” “May his power be perpetual!
“After respects, the representation is this:- That Shaik Diamutt Alee, havildar-major; and Salar Buksh, naik: and Dirguz Singh, naik: and Chundee Deen Mise, sepoy: and Jutchmun Mise, sepoy; and Lall Mund Sookoel sepoy; and Shaikh Nuzzuff Allee sepoy; and Bhowanee Singh, sepoy; and others (named in the original letter): these sepoys, sir, send here; that this regiment the havildar-major ruined, and said that the Major Sahib and Moxon Sahib told the Madras sepoys to seize all the arms of the regiment and kill them, then you will receive thirty rupees per man as reward and be promoted to subhadar bahadurs. This speech the havildar-major made to the havildars on duty. If he had not said this, we would not have deserted and saved our lives by flight, as only from the havildar-major’s speech did we deserted.
“It is proper that these men should, by some means or other, be sent to us. Let them be seized and sent. We have committed no injury to the government, and as for the muskets and cartridge boxes we have brought away with us, we have left our property in lieu thereof. Having sold it, take the price. Each sepoy left about thirty rupees worth of property. Also, send pay for one month and fifteen days. We are men of honour and are doing government good service here.
“Your lordship answered that the Madras sepoys are not under my authority. Then, having become helpless, we came away here by your order to save our lives. And on the 19th of May, when you officers fled, then we, being faithful to our salt, did not say anything to your lordships, and at that time the Madras regiment was not present; and when the adjutant sahib was attacked by a sepoy with a bayonet, if had not been true to our salt, why did we seize the sepoy and make him over to you? And your highness is our lord and master; but when we do not find any way to save our lives, we fled and came here, and we had regard to your lordship’s salt- if not, at the time we might have killed you. And if you do not let these sepoys go, then is sahib (Lieutenant Macgregor) we will not kill, but having bound him will take him to Delhi; and if you will send those sepoys, then we will cause the sahib to arrive where you are. Moreover, having seized those sepoys, send them with a guard of police, and it will be well, and if life remains, we will again be present in your service. We will not run away.
“This letter is written on the part of all the sepoys and non-commissioned officers. All the sepoys, non-commissioned and commissioned officers, send salaam.”

Back in Jabalpur, Jamieson would not allow the Madras troops to go on the offensive. Instead, expresses were sent from Jabalpur by Major Moxon to the Commissioner at Dumoh and to the two officers on the Deccan Road who had reached Sleemanabad – Lieutenants Cockburn and Burton – and to Macgregor, but he never received it.
Upon receiving the letter, Cockburn and Burton on the Deccan Road told their men what had happened at Jabalpur and said they were setting off straight away to the station and equested the men to send their baggage back to Jabalpur. The men were civil to the last and regretted they would not be accompanying their officers, but promised to send their things, which they faithfully did the next day. As soon as the officers were gone, the men of the detachments they left behind plundered the small local treasury, but stranger things can happen. One of the officers, remembering that he had left his money in the care of the pay havildar, rode back and asked him for it. With no hesitation, the havildar handed it over from a bag of rupees he had just stolen from the treasury, and the officer rode off again, his men cheering him on. The two officers reached Jabalpur safely as the men they left behind prepared to march off to Delhi. Back in Damoh, news of the Jabalpur mutiny reached the officers by express dak. Miller and Plowden now needed to make some plans.
Plowden asked the Panna Raja for help. It was clear that as soon as the news of the mutiny of the 52nd became common knowledge, there was no telling what the men of the same regiment at Damoh would do next. Writes Major Erskine:

“Consequently, arrangements had to be made to disarm these two companies; and after consultation with Colonel Miller and two other officers, in the dead of the night, the following plan was adopted: At daylight, the Commissioner gave out that it was necessary to attack a body of rebels coming towards Dumoh from the Saugor side. The two companies of the 52d were formed into the advance guard some little distance ahead of the column, then followed the two companies of the Madras 28th, behind them four guns, and then the Madras 33d (about 400 men) and the Madras cavalry on the flanks. The irregular riflemen ( who were suspected because they were originally from the same part of the country as the Bengal Infantry) were to form the rear guard as soon as the camp was struck. After marching in this way for some two miles, to a spot with an open plain on each side, the “ Halt ” was sounded; the two companies of the 28th were loaded and deployed; the guns were loaded with grape, and formed up to the left flank, unseen by the 52d companies, who, with their European officers, were halting ahead. This being done, the Commissioner told the artillery officers what was about to take place and stated that if he gave a certain signal, they were to open fire on the 52d. Colonel Millar, calling the officers of the 52d companies to him, told them the truth. The cavalry was duly warned, and so were the 28th and 33rd Madras Infantry. By this time, the arrangements were completed, and the guns were unmasked, pointing to the 52d. The 52d officers then returned to their men, piled arms, and moving them a little to the right, told them that their regiment had mutinied and that if they quietly gave up their arms, they would be protected from all harm. It was a critical moment, and there was some danger for the officers, though they had been warned to throw themselves into the ditch if their men disobeyed orders. But they saw the guns pointing at them, the port-fires lighted, and they quietly yielded to fate, marched off, and the Commissioner’s signal not being given, the guns were unloaded and limbered up.
We then marched back to camp with the disarmed men in our rear, the muskets having been taken away on the Commissioner’s elephants. The 52d men were narrowly watched that night in case of their seizing arms from the Madras troops, and their native swords ( which they had brought with them) were taken from them. The next morning ( 21st), the Punnah “General,” at the Commissioner’s request, marched into Dumoh with some of his troops and took possession, and the Nagpore column made its first march towards Jubulpore, the disarmed men being kept well in the rear.”

So Damoh was given to the care of the Panna Raja and Miller, along with the rest of the Europeans, and troops and the disarmed 52nd marched the next day to Jabalpur. It was a long, hard march. Nine days after the mutiny, they were still on the road. Colonel Miller sent a company of the 33rd Madras Native Infantry and some cavalry as an advanced guard, along with Major Jenkins (the Assistant-Quartermaster-General) and Lieutenant Watson, to secure the boats across the Hiran River at Katangi. They had received no intelligence regarding the mutinous 52nd BNI, which was supposed to be hiding in the dense jungle or, in the worst case, had retraced their steps back to Jabalpur. For all they knew, the station was by now a smouldering ruin.
The next morning around dawn, two troopers of the advance guard galloped furiously into the camp and informed Colonel Miller that the 52nd had attacked them in a narrow hill-pass, and using the jungle as cover, had ambushed the party, shooting the two officers dead. Miller wasted no time gathering up his force as best he could. Ordering the disarmed men to remain in the rear, the rest of the force advanced. Shortly after, they came upon the rest of the advance guard. Panicked and retreating in disorder, they surrounded the colonel and told him what had happened. Miller told the men off into marching order – his mission was now clear. Find the 52nd and destroy them; not that they had to search long.

“We continued to advance in battle array through the jungly hill-pass and had not gone above two more miles, when we saw the 52d marching along the road towards us in column of sections, with their British colours flying, and their drums and fifes playing an English air. We halted and let fly a round-shot through them. This appeared to stagger them; they dispersed to the right and left, and whenever we could see them, we poured in grape and musketry on them, but the jungle was dense, and our men, neither cavalry nor infantry, could get well into it in anybody.
Their shots fell amongst us and in the trees over us, and we returned the compliment whilst moving on, every now and then, for some six miles more. At length, we got to a more open place and could see some of the 52d and a lot of rebels ascending the hills to our right, and our cavalry then dashed after them. Suddenly we heard a rush and firing in our rear, and took it for granted that the doubtful riflemen were attacking our baggage, of which they were in charge; but in a few minutes we found that these men, seeing the country more open, had, along with their European officers, made a dash along our right flank, and went full tilt after the men of the 52d, who were climbing the hills. Just as we had got about two miles into the plain, Major Jenkins and Lieutenant Watson were seen by us galloping out of the jungle on our left front and going after the mutineers. It appeared that when they met the mutineers it was dark; they were fired on, Major Jenkins’s horse received many bullets in him, and Lieutenant Watson was seriously injured in his left eye by a sepoy firing so near to his head (intending to shoot him dead) that the powder burnt his eye; but throwing the man’s musket aside, and the two putting spurs to their horses, they galloped away and hid themselves till we came up. We now halted for a short time, and the enemy had got away from us to our rear. Colonel Millar considered that the ground was against fighting, and we did not follow them.”

The respectful, though bold, letter sent by the 52nd on the night they mutined reached Jabalpur and although Major Erskine thought it prudent to offer the regiment Rs 8000 for Macgregor’s release, the rest of the demands would not be met. The ransom money was rejected by the 52nd. There would be no exchange of prisoners and no pay. The 52nd had committed mutiny and such, they were no longer a part of the army. Unfortunately for Macgregor, it also signed his death warrant. He was kept alive until the 52nd regiment was attacked.

“Close to a large tree near where we halted, I regret to say, we found the lifeless body of poor Lieutenant M’ Gregor, of the 52d Regiment. They had imprisoned him at Patun and brought him with them to Kuttungee when they determined on attacking us, along with about 1000 rebels. His body bore the marks of many bayonet -wounds and sword -cuts, but was warm when found. It was sent into Jubulpore and buried with military honours. Whilst the Commissioner was standing at this sad spot, four men of the Rifles brought in a havildar ( sergeant) of the 52d. His fusil was warm and dirty from powder, and having been caught with arms in his hands and fighting against us, he was hanged on the spot.”

The injuries suffered by Macgregor were horrifying. Both his arms were broken, and his body was pierced with no less than 40 bayonet wounds, among numerous sword cuts. The coup de grâce was one shot through the neck.

The 530 men of the 52nd who had initially intended to march to Delhi (had they gone they would have been surprised to find that by 14 September, it was back in British hands) after this skirmish with Miller, continued their march but instead of leaving the territory, banded together with other rebellious chiefs and plundered the countryside. They then turned their attention to Damoh. The Panna Raja’s force was unable to withstand the onslaught, and the mutineers not only plundered the town but also released the prisoners who had until now been carefully watched. They then took possession of a fort, some thirty miles from Sagar, called Garhakota, which they then used as their base from which to launch further attacks on the surrounding area. Towards the end of 1857, even though Delhi had long since fallen and various columns were marching throughout India, there was no end to mutiny in the Sagar and Narbada Territories just yet. Sage remained besieged in his fort but was still grimly holding his own. Several skirmishes occurred, but they had no decisive effect. It was jungle warfare – as soon as the rebels had been flushed out of one, they merely regrouped and showed up in another.