The 34th BNI in Cachar

The 34th, disorganised and in full flight, fled towards Pertabgarh and managed, by keeping to the jungles, to reach the Cachar District. Unfortunately, much of the history in this regard has hardly been given the recognition it deserves, and as such, it has been necessary to piece it together using official and semi-official reports. Even with so little to go on, we shall attempt to follow the remaining men of the 34th to their final end.
The Superintendent (and first Deputy Commissioner) of Cachar, Robert Stewart, had arrived at his post in 1857. He had been keeping a watchful eye on his district and, from June until December 1857, sent his regular weekly report to Calcutta, worded more or less the same,
“I have the honour to report for the information of the Lieutenant-Governor and in continuance of my letter dated 10th inst. that all remains quiet in Chachar.” That is, until the 7th of December.

‘‘Sir,
I have the honour to report for the information of the Leut. Governor of Bengal that having received
intelligence of the Mutiny of the 3 companies of Sepoys at Chittagong, and of their having quitted the high road in the march north west, and entered the hill to the east, and being also put on my guard as to the chance of their continuing their march eastwards among these hills, and perhaps debouching into the plains at Cachar I have also taken the following measures to have them opposed. His Honor knows that the country directly south of Cachar is a vast tract of hills and jungle occupied by an independent and savage tribe called the Lhoochai, who at one time used to give us considerable trouble but with whom our relations have been most amicable for some years past.”

Stewart felt that the 34th, if they insisted on continuing eastward, would most likely be easy prey for the Lhoochais, who would most likely take their incursion into their territories as an affront, but to be sure, Stewart sent a small party bearing notices, which were somewhat curious.
“…if men come to them through the jungle from the west with red coats and heavily laden, they are our enemies and must be opposed in every possible way, if it is the wish of the Lhoochais to endeavour to please our Government. That the men themselves are most probably wealthy, and it will afford easy and good plunder, and that moreover I will give Rs. 50/- for each sepoy for whom they account to me.”
While in hopes this plan might work, Stewart posted guards on the main routes from the south with scouts who were to report directly to him should the 34th pass into the district. “I am of the opinion,” he stated, “that the march they have undertaken is more hazardous than they expected and that such a small body offering such a rich prize to the savage and warlike people through whom they travel will have no chance of escape.”
Should bribery and all else fail, he still hoped to give them a warm reception with the small detachment of Sylhet Light Infantry he had at his disposal. However, he urged the government to not only post more troops to his district, not just to put the 34th to the sword, but to put an end to the worrying rumours that the six disaffected Manipuri princes in his district were planning to attack the loyal Manipur raja and Stewart would be unable, should this be the case, to spare any men to go to his aid. There was some credence to the rumour, for a story was circulating quite freely in Cachar that the Manipuris were planning to attack the magazine and use the plundered arms to start their own civil war.

The Cachar Hills

The Battle of Latu proved to Stewart he had some cause for concern, for despite his generous offers, guards and scouts, the 34th, on the 22nd of December, were precariously close to Cachar. Not waiting to see which way they would now go as it was clear they were planning to march to Manipur, Stewart directed Lieutenant Ross, commanding the detachment of Sylhet Light Infantry, to intercept them. As Ross could only take 50 men with him, Stewart ordered the local Kuki Levy to furnish him with 25 more men. On the 20th of December, Ross took the force to Panchgan, a village 12 miles west of Cachar that commanded the western entrance into the district along the river and was a natural boundary between Cachar and Sylhet. It was presumed now the 34th would not be so reckless as to attempt the hills and risk running into “savage tribes” but concentrate on crossing the river. Ross was told to act on his own discretion, but should the 34th somehow manage to evade him, he was to return to Cachar and let them go. The deployment of Ross and the 75 men had significantly weakened Stewart’s position, and he was forced to draw guards down from the north and the east to reinforce his station so he could muster 100 sepoys. A stockade, erected at the Jalinga Outpost, was manned by 12 armed Kukis, provided by the Cachar Tea Company, thus leaving that post unmanned, but Stewart promised the Kukis, for their service, they would draw sepoys pay. A further 10 men were taken as scouts to provide intelligence and secure supplies as needed for Ross, while he increased the police force in from four to eight in each of the outlying thanas in his district.

Cachar and Sylhet tea factory, 1900s

Lieutenant Sherer, for his part, had not returned to Sylhet. He was keeping himself and his men in the field and, by doing so, was able to report that the 34th had split up into 4 parties, the strongest consisting of 50 men and the latter were heading in Ross’ direction. Ross, for his part, having heard the 34th were on the march, he endeavoured to intercept them but arrived too late. The party had already cross the valley and were heading towards the hills. Unperturbed, Ross followed the 34th and met them in the jungle.
They had taken up a position in a hillock, and although the terrain was “unsuitable for fighting”, Ross took his chance and attacked, driving the rebels off the hill and back into the jungle. His loss was one man killed, three wounded and one missing, but the rebels lost 12 dead. Stewart noted,
“The conduct of the S. L. Infry is said to have been most excellent throughout the engagement which took place. Distant not more than 30 yards from the enemy while firing, the latter tried to gain them over by every art of appealing to their religious feelings as well as nationality. Failing this they taunted them by calling them “Kristian ka Kootas” and “Golamies” but they received for answer only bullets and abuse. “ The 34th should perhaps have refrained, at this point, from such blatant insults. Ross returned to Cachar as ordered and, relieving the men he brought with him, Stewart dispatched him with another 75 to take the fight to the 34th again, who were hardly any further than before.

Jalinga Valley

On the 24th of December, Ross came upon them in the valley of Jalinga – but the rebels showed no fight. After one volley, they fled, leaving Ross’ men room to pursue them, shooting “into their rear” and killing several. In their flight, the rebels threw away their muskets, “bags of rice and rupees”, and ran with all haste into the jungle. Ross returned to Cachar, bringing with him two prisoners whom Stewart tried and had shot.
The 34th, in the meantime, had managed to consolidate – from straggling parties, they had formed up again into a force numbering no less than 200 men. They had arms, ammunition but no supplies. With some determination, they intended to cross Manipur into Nepal and from there, return to India, still resolved to return home. However, there was something else in store for them.
Captain Stevens, with a detachment of the Sylhet Light Infantry, was sent to support Stewart, who quickly sent them off to assist Ross, who was once again in the field, this time closer to the Manipur border. Irritated to no end by the Manipuri princes, Stewart now ordered two of them arrested and the others under close watch. His district was awash with panic and rumours; it was not enough he had the 34th to deal with, but local bands of robbers were taking singular enjoyment at the withdrawl of the troops from Cachar and had begun plying their trade again, looting villages.

Events now move into 1858.

By January, the 34th were still no closer to reaching Manipur. Ross and Stevens had been harrassing their flight, and after the battle at Jalinga, they had wandered for nearly a week without food and their track was easily picked up the Kuki scouts and were “found not to be making more than four miles a day and that too in a circuitous direction. The scouts came across several of them who had died of hunger and disease and also on the bodies of several of their children whom they had dashed on the ground, being unable to carry on. The scouts also killed two sepoys and stragglers and made prisoners of a Chittagong Kaider and a Seikh Faqueer.” It must be noted here, when the 34th left Chittagong, they had not neglected to take their families with them and their plight must have been desperate indeed. The next news received was grim.
The mutineers had come across the Kheddar establishment of Major Smith in the heart of jungles drove him and his meagre establishment into the jungle, then, looting with some frenzy, denuded his house of anything they could eat – it turned out they had only carried away one day’s supplies. Smith retaliated with some vigour and managed to capture four sepoys, a bhisti, 3 women and children who were duly sent to Cachar. Then, still harrassed and hounded by both Stevens and Ross, the 34th found themselves confined to the jungle and were “brought to lowest physical condition of human beings, the prisoners taken being reduced to living skeletons. They have been met and beaten at each of the three places where they endeavoured to enter the plains and are broken in spirits and reduced in number, although Captain Stevens still reports them at 150.” A further 10, who had lost their way after the Battle of Latu and strayed into Cachar, were attacked by a jemadar and 16 men of the Sylhet Light Infantry. Eight were killed, and only the remaining two were caught by Stewart’s police.
To make matters worse, the 34th could no longer count on support from Manipur directly. The princes aside, the Raja was hardly going to risk his neck for a straggling band of mutineers – as such, he deployed 400 men towards his frontier, under Major McCulloch to dissuade them, once and for all, from entering his territory. Meanwhile, the 34th resorted to plundering villages for supplies in desperate raids out of the jungle – to make their forages less successful, Stewart ordered all the villages in their sight to be evacuated, leaving the rebels once again with nothing to eat.
Then things changed.

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