The Campaign Continues – 15th to 18th October

Up to this point all the columns had reached their assigned destinations. On the night of the 15th, Brigadier Douglas, who was at Arrah, sent orders for the whole of the posts to close in on the jungle. However, the only way anyone was getting the orders was for someone to ride out into a country side swarming with rebels, along a road that was “lying in some places actually through their pickets in the jungle.” It was daredevil work but Douglas had the men for it and most unusually, mentioned them in his dispatch by number and name.

Dispatched to Pahareepore
2 Battalion Military Train
No. 826 Sergeant William Bird
No. 125, Private Patrick Bowley
No. 360 Private Thomas Daniels
No. 1102 Private Robert Morgan
No. 172 Private John Steer.
Mounted Detachment HM’s 10th Foot
No. 2337 Lance-Corporal James Maher
No. 2372 Private Edward Walsh
12th Irregular Cavalry
Duffadar Atta Hossain
Sowar Zemaun Khan

Dispatched to Piro
2nd Battalion Military Train
No. 121 Troop Sergeant Major John Shiel
No. 872 Private Thomas Blamphin
No 1050 Private Patrick Feark
No. 205 Private Lewis Hewitt
No 826 Private Patrick Stevens
Mounted Detachment HM’s 10th
No. 2393 Private James Stone,
No 3485 Private John Little,
12th Irregular Cavalry
Duffadar Ameer Ali
Nishan Burdar Ajeem Oollah Khan.

“As this was a duty of a very peculiar nature, and most important, I hope to be excused in mentioning by name every individual employed, for right well did these excellent non-commissioned officers, and the gallant men under their command, fulfil their errand ; they passed in safety through great dangers, reaching their destination at the time appointed, carrying the instructions to the advancing columns, thereby enabling them to co-operate as desired.”

The next morning, the 16th, Brigadier Douglas moved from Arrah and arrived at Behea ( the north-east corner of the jungle) early the next day. By 10 am on the 17th, he had opened communications with Major Lightfoot’s column on the west, establishing a new line of connected posts that now passed through and closed off the north of the jungle. Douglas’ cavalry and the mounted rifle detachment of HM’s 10th Foot were now pushed south of Behea some two miles east of Dawa, where they would spend the rest of the day skirmishing with detached parties of the rebels. These were appear at the edge of the jungle and then, just as quickly disappear – some appeared to be scouts and others bore the look of men who were eager to desert. In the afternoon, Douglas now sent the HM’s 35th Regiment under Captain Browne to act in conjunction with the cavalry to keep the rebels in their place during the night. While it was harassing work for his men, Douglas’ idea was sound – he would keep the rebels occupied on his front, while the remaining columns moved into place. He now sent off messages to Colonel Walter and Colonel Turner – the messenger found Turner at Piro as expected, but Colonel Walter was much to Douglas’ irritation, at Arrah.

The idea was that Colonel Walter (35th Regiment) would act as the final barrier between the rebels fleeing from Jagdispur and the river, thus closing the net. He was supposed to be at Masurhi (three miles east of Jagdispur) but the country between Belaur and Masurhi was so flooded, Walter had instead marched to Arrah and proceeded via another route to his designated position. The problem was, he would arrived too late.

On 18 October, Brigadier Douglas had come so far with his plans that he could not turn back. The rebels were in Jagdispur, exactly where he wanted them and, with the exception of Colonel Walter, everyone was in place and the final act of this very elaborate plan could begin. “Colonel Turner in communication with the force of Major Carr, then stationed on the west of the jungle, to form a connected line across it, the left of which was to rest at Jumwan (Jamuaon) on the west, the right on the plain to the east of the jungle. On the line being formed it was to advance skirmishing up the jungle, direct on Jugdeespore, so as to arrive there by noon. My column, in conjunction with that under Major Lightfoot, was to skirmish south to Jugdeespore, and attack the entrenchments on the north and east, while Colonel Dunsford, advancing from Hetumpore, attacked on the north-west...I entertained no unreasonable expectatzion in hoping to hem the rebels in their stronghold by noon on the 18th and then, by a simultaneous assault on all sides, to end the campaign in Shahabad at one blow.“

So the attack went ahead and all Douglas would find in Jagdispur was two guns and and their earthworks. Colonel Walter’s blunder had allowed them to sneak off, nearly undetected through most of the day – and as Douglas entered Jagdispur by one side, the rebels rear guard was making off through the other. As for Captain Snow:

“On the 18th instant I was joined by 20 troopers, Madras Cavalry, under Lieutenant Morris, it being supposed that the rebels were coming my way. About 4 P.M. I saw a long string of baggage coming from the south, which came into my camp, and turned out to belong to Major Carr’s force. A report was made to me that three camel loads of the ammunition belonging to that force were in the road, about two miles from Ekil, the camels having broken down. I immediately despatched fresh camels and some sowars, who brought it safe into camp at 10 P.M. Some rebels, trying to escape on-my right, were cut up by the cavalry at about 12 P.M., but with a loss of 3 resealdar wounded and 1 trooper mortally wounded, and 1 horse killed, belonging to the cavalry on my right, under Lieutenant Ryall, belonging to Major Carr’s force, who joined my camp also.”

His column would finally enter Jagdispur on 19 October. He would then spend the next weeks hunting down sepoys, the unlucky few who had not managed to escape with the main body. Snow raided villages, seizing weapons and ammunition but when it came to actual mutineers, he only caught three – two were hanged and one was released on Colonel Dunsford’s orders. The question remains, where did the rest of the mutineers go?