The Bihar Campaign October 1858 of the Shahabad Field Force

As Sir Colin Campbell already actively planning his winter campaign for November, Brigadier Douglas saw an opportunity for a swift strike in Bihar before any of his troops were requisitioned for work on the other side of the river. A secure Bihar ensured unfettered transport along the Grand Trunk Road, and protected not only Campbell’s communications but also his supply lines and troop movements from Calcutta and Allahabad into Oudh. With these objectives in mind, Douglas made his plans.

As his resources were not limitless and the possibility for reinforcements slim, Douglas decided his best option was to corner the insurgents at Jagdispur and then, in one single action, destroy them completely. In order for his plan to work, however, he first needed to move his troops into position. He would move four of his columns from Buxar to drive the rebels towards Jagdispur. Colonel Turner would advance from Sasseram, forming a connected line with the troops from Buxar, from the Ganges to the Son River, closing off the jungles to the west and the south.

The columns were composed of:

Column 1 Major Lightfoot
Her Majesty’s 64th Regiment, 150 men ;
20th Punjab Infantry, 187 men ;
4th Madras Cavalry, 80 sabres.

Column 2 Colonel Dunsford
Her Majesty’s 84th Regiment, 100 men ;
20th Punjab Infantry, 150 men ;
4th Madras Cavalry, 40 sabres;
Sikh Cavalry, 40 sabres.

Column 3 Captain Snow
h Her Majesty’s 84th Regiment, 126 men ;
20th Punjab Infantry, 200 men ;
3d Sikh Cavalry, 80 sabres.

Column 4 Major Carr
Her Majesty’s 84th Regiment, 100 men ;
20th Punjab Infantry, 150 men ;
3d Sikh Cavalry, 80 sabres.

A further force was stationed at Piro under Colonel Turner and another under Colonel Walter, who was to take the eastern section of the Jagdispur jungles from Sondi. They were to be in position by noon of 15 October, with the intention of, “driving all before them towards the jungle, and to form a connected line of infantry with advanced cavalry posts in the intervals. Colonel Turner was to form three posts to the south, thus completing the chain from the Ganges to the Soane, and he himself with a moveable column to drive in the southern division of the enemy at Peeroo. Colonel Walter was to take up his position to the east of Jagdispur, he having previously driven into the jungle the Balawar division of the rebels.“

Meanwhile, Brigadier Douglas would march towards Arrah with:

Madras Artillery – one 24-pounder howitzer, one 9-pounder gun, two 5 1/2 inch mortars
Bengal Artillery – two 12-pounder Mountain Train howitzers, horsed
D-Troop Military Train – 1 officer, 31 men
Mounted Detachment of HM’s 10th Foot, 1 officer, 42 men
Shahabad Mounted Police – 2 officers and 30 men
3rd Sikhs, 5th and 12th Irregular Cavalry – 16 troopers
HM’s 35th Regiment -15 officers and 301 men

On 9 October, Douglas was ready. The ground his men would traverse was still swampy from the rains and large tracts were underwater – while this was a marked disadvantage if the forces were to converge at the set place on time, it also prevented the rebels from effectively leaving the district.
The columns began to move on 14 October and by the next day, Douglas had driven the rebels out of Karisath; on the same day, guns were heard in the direction of Brahmpur. However both Major Carr and Captain Snow would meet with some obstacles.

We begin with Major Carr.
Having received instructions from Colonel Dunsford to see Captain Snow safely off beyond Chaugain, on 14 October Major Carr had turned off his direct route to his post at Ikil and proceeded with his column to Kuran. As it was unclear whether Chaugain was in rebel hands or not, Carr sent one troop of the 3rd Sikh Cavalry under Lieutenant Gibson to ascertain the truth. Gibson quickly returned with the news that they had been fired upon as they approached Chaugain and that, as it was, a large body of no less than 1000 rebels were marching eastwards towards Jagdispur.
Together with Captain Snow’s column, Carr moved, with some caution, towards Chaugain and, true to their word, the rebels opened fire – to Carr’s surprise, many of them with Enfields – from the village’s rooftops. They had also thrown up an embankment on the side Carr and Snow were approaching; however, on reconnoitring, Carr found they had left the south side of Chaugain open. He now moved the infantry to that side and then, formed up in two columns, Carr and Snow moved into the village from the south and the east. Ready for a stiff fight, they were surprised to find the rebels had rushed out through the north side of the village and the place was deserted. Lieutenant Gibson and the Sikhs followed them up and cut up some 50 sepoys; Captain Wyatt of the Military Train, who had taken a different direction to Gibson, caught up with the rebels three miles north of Chaugain and put to the sword another 20. They still numbered some 300, split into two parties; those pursued by Wyatt now took refuge in a village where cavalry was unable to manoeuvre. So Wyatt sent a message to Carr to bring up the infantry.
Carr decided to oblige and set off with 100 men of the 84th and 150 of the Punjab infantry, only to find that the ground they were to cover was hardly more than a lake. After wading a considerable distance through mud, he received another note from Wyatt that one company of Punjabis would be more than enough for the work at hand as the remaining sepoys did not number more than 70.
So Carr sent the Punjabis onwards under Lieutenant Jarrett (of the 20th) and Lieutenant Sadlier of the Madras Rifles. The march went from bad to worse – where they had before only been wading through water and mud, they now sank up to their waists and on occasion up to their chests, holding their rifles over their heads as they proceeded – they arrived to find the sepoys barricaded in a strong tiled house. The building had only one narrow entrance and they were determined that no one was going to get them out. Lieutenant Jarrett, however, was certainly going to try. Calling on the men of his regiment to follow him and made a dash at the entrance under a shower of bullets. He then pushed his way up to the wall of the house and then, “beating up the bayonets of the rebels with his sword, endeavoured to get in…” only then did Jarrett realise that none but 4 of his men had followed him. The lieutenant beat a hasty retreat.
Meanwhile Carr was getting a little impatient with these shenanigans. It was getting late and both columns had to be in place for the final attack on Jagdispur in the morning by 10 am, he sent word to Captain Wyatt to let the rebels off and return to camp.

“I beg to bring to notice the cheerful manner in which the parties of the 84th, under Captains Snow and Barry, went through the fatigues of this trying day’s work, as also the party of the Punjaub Infantry under Lieutenants Sadlier and Jarrett. The 84th had only disappointment instead of the enemy, which though expected in Choungien, they proved only an empty town.
Of the cavalry part of the force I cannot speak too highly ; the train under Captain Wyatt, and part of the Sikh Cavalry under Captain Ryall, did all that men and horses could do, coming up with and killing the sepoys in ground up to their horses’ bellies ; but I beg more particularly to notice the able manner in which Lieutenant Gibson, of the 3rd Sikh Cavalry, conducted the duties of finding out and following up three of the enemy ; his activity, intelligence, and, in a word, his complete success in every measure entrusted to him, deserve the highest praise.”

In his dispatch, Major Carr recommended Lieutenant Jarrett for the Victoria Cross, but nothing came of it.

The objective of taking Chaugain had been acheived – the rebels had been driven into the jungle and the way for Captain Snow to Pahari Chak was now open. Carr now marched to Ikil, arriving the next day shortly before 10 in the morning.

As for Captain Snow
Captain Snow left Chaugain on 15 October and proceeded to Pahari Chak where he arrived at 8 in the morning. He sent his cavalry to watch the jungle just west of his position. He opened communications with both Major Carr (at Ikil) and Colonel Dunsford (at Piprarh). The next day, Snow marched onwards towards Bhadwar but his plans were thrown into some disarray by the sudden appearance of a very excited Lieutenant Gibson. He had been forced from his post to the west by a large body of rebels, some three times the number of Snow’s column. Snow, however, pushed on to Bhadwar.
When he arrived, he found no less than 2000 rebels and 70 sowars waiting for him and all that separated his column from them was a narrow river. For reasons known only to himself, Snow could not “induce them to cross the Nuddee”, so instead he threw out a company of the 84th in skirmishing order with the 20th Punjab Infantry between them. With the company the 84th he had kept as support and 100 Sikhs, Snow advanced to the edge of the river – despite their numbers, they turned and and disappeared into the edge of the jungle, keeping well out of range of Snow’s Enfields. As dusk was quickly coming on, Snow left the company of the 84th by the nullah to ambush anyone considering crossing the river, while he retired to a tope of trees just outside Bhadwar. No sooner was Snow’s back turned that the rebels came down to the river. A volley from the 84th sent four of their sowars tumbling to the ground.
Recalling the 84th to camp, Snow now sent word to his cavalry on the right and left to keep watch on the river – however the rebels, using the cover of darkness now crossed the river but satisfied themselves with taking shots at Snow’s picquets until 2 in the morning. At this point, Lieutenant Gibson drove them back across and into the jungle. The infantry had remained under arms the entire night in case of an emergency and must have been with little joy, when at daybreak on the 17th, Snow ordered the advance.
The rebels, for their part, were seen to be marching “steadily into the jungle towards Jugdespore in columns of sections” and Snow ordered Lieutenant Gibson, with the cavalry, to follow them for a short distance. He was to reconnoitre and “burn all the villages for two miles each way, north and south, which was effectually done; about nine rebels, trying to escape, were cut up…”