John Lawrence and his administrators set up several measures to keep peace in Punjab, which, besides disarming regiments throughout the region, included actively censoring the post and monitoring letters for any signs of sedition, posting guards at all ferries and hill passes. They also went as far as disarming a sizeable portion of the civil population and arresting anyone who even looked askance.

• Peshawar – HM’s 79th and 87th:
  Artillery – Two Troops of Horse Artillery; two Light Field Batteries
  four reserve companies (Europeans);
  7th and 18th Irregular Cavalry
  5th Light Cavalry
  21st BNI – disarmed
  24th BNI – disarmed
  27th BNI- disarmed
  51st BNI – disarmed – mutinied and were destroyed
  64th BNI and Khillat-i-Ghilzie Regiment remained loyal
  
• Nowshera – Artillery and Mountain Train Battery,
  Punjabis,
  H.M.’s 27th Foot
  55th BNI – mutinied and destroyed
• 10th Irregular Cavalry – disarmed and disbanded

• Attock – 1 Company Reserve Artillery, natives disarmed
  ONe Company Sappers and Miners, natives disarmed
  Detachment of the 58th BNI

• Shumshabad – 17th Irregulars
  
• Mardan – Corps of Guides
  
• Rawalpindi – one troop Horse Artillery, natives disarmed
  HM’s 24th Foot
  Kumaon Battalion
  16th Irregular Cavalry
  58th BNI – disarmed
  
• Jhelum – one Light Field Battery, natives disarmed;
  14th BNI
  39th BNI – ordered to Dera Ismail Khan and there disarmed
  
• Sealkote – One troop Horse Artillery (Europeans); One Light Field Battery (Europeans);
  HM’s 52nd Foot
  35th BNI
  46th BNI
  9th Light Cavalry
  
• Jalandhar – One Troop Horse Artillery (Europeans);
  HM’s 8th Foot;
  6th Light Cavalry
  36th BNI and 61st BNI
  These three corps mutinied and marched to Delhi
  
• Phillour – 3rd BNI – mutinied and joined the Jullundar mutineers.
  
• Hoshiarpore – one troop Native Horse Artillery four guns with British force at Delhi, remainder of troop disarmed;
  33rd BNI – disarmed at Phillour;
  The 9th Irregular Cavalry served with the British force at Delhi; one troop deserted, and the regiment was ordered back.
  
• Noorpore – Half company Native Foot Artillery and Right Wing 4th BNI
• Kangra – Half company of Native Foot Artillery and Left Wing 4th BNI
  
• Goordaspore – 2nd Irregular Cavalry
  
• Ferozepore – 1 Company European Foot Artillery; 1 European Light Field Battery;
  HM’s 61st Foot;
  10th Light Cavalry – disarmed and subsequently mutinied; a portion escaped to Delhi
  45th BNI and 57th BNI – the first mutinied; disbanded
  
• Multan – 1st Irregular Cavalry
  One Troop Native Horse Artillery – disarmed
  62nd BNI – disarmed
  69th BNI – disarmed
  
• Ambala – two troops European Horse Artillery;
  HM’s 9th Light Dragoons
  4th Bengal Lancers – native portion disarmed and portion employed on service
  5th BNI – disarmed
  60th BNI – mutinied on route to Rotak, marched to Delhi
  
• Juttogh near Simla – Nusseree Battalion, temporary disaffection, order restored, regiment employed on service
  
• Dagshaie – 1st Bengal Fusiliers
  
• Kussowlie – HM’s 75th Foot
  
• Subathu – 2nd European Bengal Fusiliers
  
• The Punjab Frontier – guarded by four local regiments of Sikh Infantry, besides the Guide Corps at Murdan. Punjab Irregular Force consisting of four light field batteries, five regiments of cavalry, and six regiments of infantry
  
• Lahore – Two Troops of Horse Artillery, Europeans; 4 Companies Reserve Artillery, Europeans; HM’s 81st Foot
  8th Light Cavalry – disarmed
  16th BNI – disarmed
  26th Light Infantry – disarmed
  49th BNI disarmed
  
• Amritsar – One company of European Reserve Artillery in the fort of Govindgurh
  ONe Light Field Battery, natives disarmed
  59th BNI – disarmed

Disarming regiments comprising hundreds of men was obviously not an easy task. With some stations boasting but a few European troops and others none at all, it was decided at Peshawar on the 12th of May that a strong moveable column comprising of European and Irregular troops would be needed to take the field at once. The initial discussion was held by no other than two of Henry Lawrence’s Young Men – Herbert Edwardes and John Nicholson.

The Men for a Crisis

In order to put their plan into action, they needed support – Edwardes immediately sent for Brigadier Neville Chamberlain stationed at Kohat and commander of the Punjab Irregular Force. The next day, upon Chamberlain’s arrival, the men met together in the house of the local divisional commander Major-General Thomas Reed along with Brigadier Sydney Cotton, the station commander. Frederick Roberts took the minutes of the meeting.

Not that there was much to decide. Major-General Reed, aged 61, deferred everything to Edwardes and Nicholson, and John Lawrence had already approved the plan of the moveable column anyway. It was a mere formality that it was held at all. Nicholson told the assembly he had been expecting a mutiny for some time:” Neither greased cartridges, the annexation of Oude, nor the paucity of European officers were the causes. For years, I have watched the army and felt sure they only wanted the opportunity to try their strength with us…” They were all in agreement that the mutiny needed to be crushed as quickly as possible. However, the problem facing them was how to secure the Punjab with so few European troops. In every station, the majority of the troops were from Bengal regiments, with some boasting but a few Europeans,  while in other stations, there were none. The only way to do this would be to put their trust in the local chiefs and their people and actively encourage them to side with the British. Edwardes and Nicholson would also open communication with their friends and allies along the borders who had supported the British during the last Sikh war, rally them against the mutiny, and endeavour to encourage all of them to send men as fresh troops.

The other conclusion drawn was to send Reed away; he was to join Lawrence at Rawalpindi and leave the running of operations in Peshawar solely in the hands of Brigadier Cotton. At 63, he was an active, alert soldier; and Reed, though younger and more experienced in war than Cotton, was no longer in touch with his faculties – he wisely took himself out of the fray and on the 14th of May was on his way to Rawalpindi with Roberts in tow, who was now quarter-master general of the Moveable Column. Little did Roberts know that he would never return to Peshawar.

Neville Chamberlain was appointed commander of the Moveable Column – a position which would have suited Nicholson, but his talents were needed in Peshawar. The meeting left nothing to chance: the column would be formed at Jhellum; the Bengal regiments were to be “scattered as much as possible in order to prevent dangerous combinations,” a detachment of Punjab Irregulars would be sent to replace the sepoys guarding Attock Fort, situated on the Indus, and housing a substantial magazine, and Pathan levies would be dispatched to guard the Attock Ferry, thus ensuring passage would remain secure.

Chamberlain was quick to move. He returned to Kohat to muster his men – the 2nd Punjab Cavalry – and met Roberts and Reed at Attock Ferry on the 15th of May. Waiting for them was Captain Henry Daly and 500 men of his Corps of Guides. Shortly after, Edwardes was summoned to Rawalpindi by John Lawrence.

From Calcutta, Governor General Lord Canning had requested that all possible troops be sent to Delhi – even if this meant effectively stripping the Punjab of its force. The only solution was to raise more irregulars in the province and send every man possible to Delhi – Lawrence agreed the risk was worth taking and the first to march from Rawalpindi on the 19th of May were Daly’s Guides.

By the 21st Edwardes was back in Peshawar, met by a despondent Nicholson who had been unable to raise a single recruit from his Pathan associates who were by now convinced the company rule was over and their prestige was gone. The 64th BNI, in the meantime, had already been broken up and sent off to join reliable troops of irregulars at various stations along the Khyber Pass – the idea was to keep them out of mischief while allowing another troop to watch over them. This did not, however, solve the problem with those that remained in Peshawar.

Decisions were swift in coming. The 55th mutinied in Nowshera on the 22nd, and the 10th Cavalry had refused to act against them; it was now deemed imperative to disarm the rest at Peshawar, namely the 21st, 24th, 27th and 51st Bengal Native Infantry and the 5th Light Cavalry. The 51st had already been found complicit in mutiny – they, however, were not aware that a letter their chief conspirators had intended for the 64th was in fact handed into their commanding officer Lieutenant-Colonel Garrett by the sepoys of the 64th themselves. There was no time to waste.

The commanding officers of all nine regiments were summoned at dawn on the 23rd of May to the quarters of Brigadier Cotton, where they were informed which regiments were to be disarmed. The commanders, for their part, were beside themselves, protesting vehemently for the fidelity of their men, with one concluding that if anyone tried to take their arms, his men would undoubtedly mutiny. Their protests were not considered, and Brigadier Cotton, in his brisk fashion, concluded the meeting, “No more discussion, gentlemen! These are my orders, and I must have them obeyed!” By mid-morning, the regiments in Peshawar had been disarmed without a single word of dissent from the men. The effect this had on the local chiefs, however, was astonishing. Barely had Edwardes, Nicholson, and Cotton left the parade ground when they were swarmed by men all ready to join the levies – the successful disarming had been the show of strength that was sorely needed to restore the British prestige.

The Moveable Column was organised at Jhellum as planned and was to have consisted of HM’s 27th Foot from Nowshera, HM’s 24th from Rawalpindi, a European troop of Horse Artillery from Peshawar, one Light Field Battery from Jhelum, the Guide Corps from Mardan, the 16th Irregular Cavalry from Rawalpindi, the 1st Punjab Infantry from Banu, the Kumaon Battalion from Rawalpindi, a wing of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry from Kohat and half a company of sappers from Attock. However, even the best plans can change – firstly, the 27th was recalled, then Guides Corps and the Kumaon Battalion were sent to Delhi, with the Guides covering the entire distance from Mardan to Delhi in marches of thirty miles a day. The 1st Punjab Infantry, too, were sent for service to Delhi as was the horse artillery. Soon after, Chamberlain was promoted to adjutant general, and on the 22nd of June, Nicholson took over the Moveable Column. With him came his personal guard of 250 frontier horsemen, men who came out of loyalty and devotion to Nicholson alone. Among them was Muhammad Hyat Khan.

Raised and educated by British officers and fluent in Persian, Muhammad Hyat Khan was the son of Karram Khan – a man who had saved Nicholson’s life many years earlier. Upon Karram Khan’s death, Nicholson had taken a personal interest in the welfare of his orphaned children, and Muhammad Hyat Khan eventually became Nicholson’s orderly. Known for never leaving Nicholson’s side, He slept across his doorway to prevent others from entering and at meals would stand behind Nicholson’s chair with a cocked revolver. It would be Muhammad Hyat Khan who would care for Nicholson for the whole ten days it would take him to die in Delhi.

The  55th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry

• 1815 raised as Ockterlony Ka Dinah Paltan, 1st Batt. 28th Regt.

With Peshawar under control, Cotton could now turn his attention to the mutinous 55th. Although the detachment had been brought back to line by their officers, they had been ordered to rejoin the rest of the 55th at Hoti Mardan. Cotton saw no choice but to disarm them all. Ordering Colonel Chute of the 70th Foot – a force of three hundred British soldiers, eight guns and 400 irregular horsemen – to proceed at once to Hoti Mardan, they were outside the station by nightfall on the 24th of May. Accompanying them was John Nicholson as a political officer. The news of their approach displeased not just the 55th but the commander, Colonel Henry Spottiswoode. Although he had only been with them for two years, his unwavering trust and confidence in his men had led him to write to Brigadier Cotton, pleading on their behalf that they be spared from punishment. The Indian officers of the 55th, in their turn, had some faith in Spottiswoode since they now demanded to know why the Europeans were approaching Hoti Mardan – in his desperation, Spottiswoode did not wait for the obvious outcome. He returned to his quarters and shot himself.

By daybreak, Chute, the 70th and Nicholson were in sight of the Hoti Mardan Fort. For their part, the 55th loaded themselves up with as much ammunition and treasure as they could carry and beat a hasty but organised retreat, in marching order and with colours unfurled.

Chute’s men were too tired to give chase, but Nicholson and the cavalry were not – receiving Chute’s permission, Nicholson now took charge and sped off after the retreating 55th, who turned to face him, their Indian officers ordering them to halt and prepare to receive cavalry. They never completed their manoeuvre – as textbook as it was, they were still in the act of loading their muskets when Nicholson and the cavalry were on them, sabres flying. Abandoning their line, the 55th ran off in blind panic into the surrounding countryside, with Nicholson and the cavalry in pursuit. Those who could stood and fought with as much determination as any man would who was faced with no chance of escape. Nicholson and the cavalry were unrelenting in chasing the men out of hiding places in villages, “and grappled with in ravines, and hunted over ridges all that day from Fort Mardan to the borders of Swat, and found respite only the failing light.” 120 men of the 55th were killed, nearly the same number were captured along with the regimental colours and two hundred muskets were retrieved.

Those who made it over the border sought refuge in the Lund Khaur Hills but the local chiefs soon chased them away. They tried to go to Kashmir in the vain belief that the ruler Maharaja Golab Singh would be sympathetic to their cause, but they were thwarted, this time by Hazara tribesmen. Some of the men of the 55th were taken prisoner, others executed and still, others were forced further into the mountains where they died of starvation and exposure. The few who survived being taken prisoner only did so by agreeing to convert to Islam – thus losing the very caste and religion they had sworn to protect.

As for the men taken prisoner by Nicholson, 40 of them would be blown away from guns, and the rest were spared as it could be proved they had “allowed themselves to be carried away in a panic by the mass.” The execution of the 40 men of the 55th was carried out in the first week of June. Unlike the men of the 51st, they were led out onto the parade ground, summarily tied to the guns and blown to pieces.

A similar fate awaited the subedar-major and 250 men of the 51st – upon realising that the letter intended for the 64th had been handed to Garrett, they had fled Peshawar and tried to find refuge in the mountains. However, many of them were returned by the Pathan tribesman, including the subedar-major who was hung for mutiny on the 29th of May, and on the 30th a further four non-commissioned officers and eight sepoys of the 51st were executed the same way.

The 64th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry

• 1813 raised as Harroitt Ka Paltan, 2nd Batt. 32nd BNI
• Battle Honours: Cabul, 1842

With Mardan secured, the fort was handed over to the care of Vaughn’s trusted Punjabis. However, at other frontier forts, namely Abuzai, Shabkadr and Michni, there was a cause for concern. Each of these posts was garrisoned conjointly by the loyal Kailat-i-Ghilzai and the disloyal 64th, who had been trying for weeks to infect their colleagues with the spirit of mutiny. The question was how to disarm them. At Nicholson’s suggestion, the disarming of the 64th should be entrusted to the Peshawar column under Brigadier Chute, which had been in the field for nearly two weeks, ably guided by Nicholson, who had directed them in operations along the Swat border. Their objective was to thwart the attempts of a notable outlaw, Ajun Khan, who had been trying to sow dissent in that quarter. Intelligence reached Nicholson that for some time, emissaries, mainly mullahs from the hills, had been going “backwards and forewards” between the 55th and certain parts of the country, spreading the word of mutiny. Doubtlessly, the 64th had been considering their options well before May.

On the morning of the 30th of May, Edwardes received a letter from Nicholson in which he wrote,
“I am strongly inclined to believe that we should not merely disarm but disband the corps and the 10th Irregular Cavalry. There is no doubt that they have both been in communication with the Akhand of Swat…I believe we did not pitch into the 55th one day too soon. That corps and the 64th were all planning to go over to Akhand together. I have got a man who taunted my police on the line of march with siding with the infidels in a religious war. May I hang him?” The same day, the Peshawar column reached Abuzai, where Nicholson found the 64th “looking very villainous but of course perfectly quiet.”
The Ghilzais reported that they had been struggling against the treasonous talk of the regiment; as soon as Nicholson arrived, they broke off all contact with the 64th.
In the first days of June, Nicholson received permission to disarm the 64th at Abuzai, Shabkadr and Michni – it happened with no fuss- while Brigadier Chute quietly disarmed the portions of the regiment that had been attached to his brigade. As for the 10th Irregular Cavalry, while Nicholson did not trust them, he saw no option but to keep them; Delhi had not been retaken, and he could not risk depleting even more forces in the Punjab.
On the 10th of June, Nicholson was back in Peshawar, just ahead of Chute’s brigade. He took a little time to write home, as comforting a letter as he could manage, to his mother. “I just write a few lines to tell you that we are quiet here and have made ourselves secure by disarming all the disaffected native regiments. Charles is with a wing of his regiment in the neighbourhood of Lahore. Do not be under any apprehension about either of us. I consider that we are stronger in the Punjab at this moment than in any other part of the Bengal Presidency.”

This was a far cry from what Sir John Lawrence was thinking. In a moment of panic, he wrote to his subordinates a most disheartening proposal: “Look ahead and consider what should be done in the event of a disaster at Delhi.” In that case, he held that “we must concentrate. Our safety depends on this. In order to retain our hold on Lahore and Multan, we must make up our minds to abandon Peshawar and the trans-Indus frontier. But the withdrawal from Peshawar should take place early in the day, for at the eleventh hour it would be difficult, perhaps impossible.” Surprised, Nicholson and Edwardes baulked as they further read, that Sir John proposed inviting the Amir of Kabul to take charge of the Peshawar Valley, “and promising to leave him there in full possession, if he remained true to us throughout the crisis.” Lawrence insisted he would keep the Derajat for the present, but even this he was prepared, if necessary, to give up. Edwardes wrote him back that Peshawar was

“… the anchor of the Punjab; and if you take it up, the whole ship will drift to sea.” The Peshawar valley and the Manjha— the country about Lahore and Amritsar — were the two vital points on the holding of which must depend on our mastery of the Punjab. Whatever disasters might occur at Delhi, so long as we held Peshawar and the Manjha with an adequate force, we could keep our footing in the Punjab until troops arrived from England. To retreat from the frontier would only tend to renew the disasters of our retreat from Kabul. ‘‘We earnestly hope,” continued Edwardes, “that you will stand or fall at Peshawar. It must be done somewhere; let us do it in the front, giving up nothing.”

Sir John Lawrence, however, was not deterred; he would continue flouting his proposal at Edwardes until August when a rather irate Canning wrote, “Hold on to Peshawar to the last. Give up nothing.”

Wasting no time, Chamberlain ordered the two men tried by drum-head court martial, composed solely of native officers. Inevitably, the two men were found guilty and sentenced to be blown away from guns in the presence of the whole regiment, and it was Bourchier’s guns that would do it.

“The execution was a terrible one. Having been directed to carry it out in my battery, I was close to the wretches and could watch every feature; they showed the most perfect apathy: one man merely saying that he had some money in the hands of the non-commissioned officer of his company; the other never uttered a word. This was the first tragedy of the kind carried out and must have struck awe and terror into the minds of all who witnessed it.”
Chamberlain then addressed the horrified men of the 35th BNI.
“Those men have been blown from guns, and not hung, because they were Brahmins, and I wish to save them from the pollution of the hangman’s [sweeper’s] touch, and thus prove to you that the British Government does not wish to injure your caste and religion. I call upon you to remember that each one of you has sworn to be obedient and faithful to your salt. Fulfil this sacred oath, and not a hair of your head shall be hurt. God forbid that I should have to take the life of another soldier, but, like you, I have sworn to be faithful and do my duty, and I will fulfil my vow by blowing away every man guilty of sedition and mutiny, as I have done today. Listen to no evil counsel, but do your duty as good soldiers.“

With these and all our Punjab regiments with their extra companies, we shall have an ample force to hold our own if the Punjab Force only remain loyal. I have told Richard to go on raising horsemen to any extent. — Yours sincerely, John Lawrence.

Meanwhile, in Multan, Neville Chamberlain’s brother, Major Crawford Chamberlain, with the 2nd Punjab Corps, successfully disarmed the 62nd and the 69th BNI on the 10th of June on Sir John Lawrence’s behest.

Nicholson Takes Over the Column

Nevile Chamberlain received the news of Chester’s death at Badli-ki-Serai with mixed feelings. He was not inclined to take up office work, but he wanted to take part in the Siege of Delhi. He accepted the offer to replace Chester as Adjutant-General. In a letter to his brother on the 19th of June, he wrote,

“My dear Crawford, Nicholson is to be at Lahore today on his way to relieve me of the command of the movable column, and as soon as he joins, I shall start for Delhi, having been appointed by Gen. Reed to officiate as Adjt-Gen. of the army. I do not desire the permanent appointment, but as the authorities think I could now be useful as head of the Staff, I am, of course, ready and willing to obey the summons. I prefer the frontier command to any other appointment, and if they will do things my way, I will, in six years, promise them peace from Cashmere to Sonde. I have been at Phillour and Ferozepore arranging about the defence of those places and seeing to the transport of military stores for the army before Delhi. 1 found it necessary to detain a small European detachment here, for the revolt of the native troops has unsettled men’s minds, and the idea was beginning to gain ground that our power was shaken. The movable column is at Khutapore. Fortunately, up to this time, we have been able to maintain the bridges across the Beas and Sudej, and both rivers are unusually low — indeed, the Sutlej was falling rapidly…Did I tell you that I received full authority to do whatever I thought proper in this part of the country, with the promise of full support? It was the only possible way for me to be able to be of any real use, for nothing can be worse than divided authority. I am sorry the Chief Commissioner has not coincided with me as to disarming the remaining corps in this neighbourhood. Once all the corps going towards Delhi have passed on, and the movable column has returned to Lahore, there will be nothing to prevent the native corps from marching off with colours flying and drums beating.”
On this ominous note, Chamberlain took his leave of the Moveable Column. He arrived in Delhi on the 24th of June. In the meantime, another departure took place – this time, the 1st Infantry of the Punjab Irregular Force (Coke’s Rifles) left for Delhi, leaving Nicholson, once again, with a depleted force.

However, Nicholson was not a man to wait. He quickly reorganised the Column and prepared them for their first march. On the morning of the 25th of June, they found themselves under the walls of the Fort of Phillour. He had with him the 33rd BNI, who had been ordered to proceed by forced march to Philllour from their station, Hooshiarpore. Little did they know, it was their last march. Until they arrived in Phillour, both the 33rd and the 35th believed they were following their commanders to Delhi.

Two of Nicholson’s staff officers, Captain Farrington and Lieutenant Roberts, were sent ahead to Phillour to examine the ground that came within range of the fort’s guns. they also examined the Bridge of Boats and were ordered to collect wagons as if making preparations for the troops to cross the river. During the night, Nicholson himself rode ahead of the Column to see the grounds in front of the fort for himself. Proclaiming these too small for his purpose, he fell back on the regular camping ground. Meanwhile, Mr. Ricketts, magistrate of Ludhiana, instructed the police under his command to double their guard on the bridge of boats. They were told that should there be any sound of firing from Nicholson’s camp, they were to immediately cut the boats loose.
Early in the morning on the 25th, the head of the column marched up to the spot where Nicholson had prepared his trap. The artillery, with HM’s 52nd on either flank, was drawn up on the right side of the road, unlimbered. Nicholson told Bourchier, as he leaned over one of his guns,
“If they bolt, you follow as hard as you can; the bridge will have been destroyed, and we shall have a second Sobraon on a small scale.”
Within a few moments, up came the 35th BNI.

They were ordered to turn to the left and pass around the rear of the serai that lay in the corder of the camping ground – then, they wheeled again to their right and formed a close column only to find themselves staring at Bourchier’s guns. Their commander, Colonel Younghusband, was told by Nicholson that his men “must give up their arms.” The order was given, and the crestfallen 35th obeyed without a murmur. The arms were promptly gathered up and taken into the fort by the wagons organised by the staff officers the day before. Colonel Younghusband, who had served with the 35th for thirty-three years, was heard to mutter, “Thank God,” when the order was given.
The 33rd came up next. They had fallen behind, tired from their forced march from Hoshiarpore – when they finally arrived, the 35th had already been marched off, and they were left alone on the field, facing Bourchier’s guns. When their commander, Colonel Sandeman, received the order to disarm his men, he exclaimed, “What, disarm my regiment? I will answer with my life for the loyalty of every man!” The order was repeated, and Sandeman burst into tears. He had served with the 33rd for thirty-two years and had commanded them through the Sutlej Campaign. Like the 35th, the 33rd obeyed without any protests. In one fell swoop, Nicholson had disarmed 1500 men without a single shot fired.
“Among the many native spectators of that morning’s work was an old Sikh colonel who had fought against us at Gujarat. “You have drawn the fangs of 1,500 snakes,” he remarked to Captain Farrington. “Truly, your ikbal [good fortune] is great.”
The 9th Cavalry was left in line; being in communication with their comrades in Sialkote, Nicholson decided it was prudent to deal with them later.
Nicholson gave the disarmed regiments a stern warning – any attempt to flee would be punished by death; the river crossings were being watched, and escape was impossible. As it was, eight men of the 35th tried their luck. To their misery, they were caught, tried by drumhead court martial and summarily executed.
The 33rd BNI was then left disarmed at Jalandhar.

The 33rd Regiment of Bengal Infantry Hilliard Ka Pultan
1798 raised as 2nd Btn 16th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry following 1796 reorganisation when previous 16th became 2nd Btn 7th Regt
1824 2nd Battalion became the 33rd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry under Major J Hay
Battle Honours: Laswaree, Bhurtpore, Cabool 1842

The 33rd did not mutiny in 1857, and as a result, in 1861 were raised to the position of 4th most senior regiment in the Bengal Army and became the 4th Bengal Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry. They would win awarded subsequent Battle Honours: Afghanistan 1879-80 and Burma 1885-87. At Indian Independence in 1947, the regiment was still alive and well and was allocated to India and renamed the Rajput Regiment. They had been disarmed simply because Nicholson could not take the chance of leaving a regiment in his rear that might or might not rise, a gamble he was not willing to take.

It was, however, a sad ending for the 35th.

The 35th Regiment of Bengal Infantry – Noke ka Pultan

1798 raised as 2nd Btn 17th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry following 1796 reorganisation when previous 17th became 2nd Btn 12th Regt
1824 2nd Battalion became the 35th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry under Major R W Baldock
1834 renamed 35th Bengal Native Light Infantry
Battle Honours: Allygarh, Dehlee, Bhurtpore, Afghanistan, Ghaznee, Jellalabad, Cabul (1842)

In 1838, they had been part of the force sent into Afghanistan – they occupied Kandahar in April 1839 and then stormed Ghazni in August of the same year. On General Sale’s retreat from Kabul, which ended in Jellallabad on the 13th of November 1841, his force consisted of two infantry units, 700 men of the British regular 13th Light Infantry and 600 of the 35th NI. The 35th would end up being the only Bengal Infantry Regiment to receive the battle honour Jellallabad for their part in the siege, which lasted 155 days. The honour was inscribed over the mural crown on their Colours. They also carried an honourary Colour inscribed with “Lake and Victory” for their part in the 2nd Mahrata War. Unfortunately, the 35th had been implicated in seditious behaviour during their time in Sialkot and were openly in communication with the mutineers at Delhi.

Disarming the 59th Regiment

The work done, the Column, with the two disarmed regiments still in tow, now boarded boats on the 28th of June – the river had risen, and the Bridge of Boats had been washed away – on the 5th of July, they were back in Amritsar, first dropping off the 33rd BNI at Jalandhar. The 35th, on the other hand, was left encamped halfway between Amritsar and the banks of the Beeas.
On the 8th of July, the first tidings reached Amritsar of the mutiny in Jhelum. Nicholson waited for a favourable report from Jhelum, hoping the mutineers had been defeated, but the news did not come. Not able to leave anything to chance, he decided to disarm the 59th BNI at Amritsar. On the morning of the 9th, following a punishment parade held on a plain between the city and the fort of Govindgarh to blow from a gun one rebel, the 59th was ordered to lay down their arms.

The 59th had not shown any signs of mutiny and were, by right, a loyal regiment, and Nicholson took the decision with great reluctance. In his official dispatch, he wrote,
“I feel bound, however, to place on record my belief that, both in conduct and feeling, this regiment was quite an exceptional one at the present crisis. It has neither committed itself in any way nor do I believe that, up to the day they were disarmed, it any intention of committing itself, and I may deeply regret that, even as a precautionary measure, it should have been my duty to disarm it. I beg very strongly to recommend this corps, both as regards officers and men, to the favourable consideration of Government.“
He must have felt worse when, after the disarming, the men of the 59th went straight to their bells of arms and of their own accord made over several hundred muskets belonging to sick and absent comrades. The 59th would not fight in 1857, remaining disarmed. In 1861, they would subsequently become the 8th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment. In 1947, they became the 4th Battalion – the Rajput Regiment – and in 1956, were amalgamated into the Punjab Regment, one of the oldest infantry regiments in India.

Around dawn on the 10th of July, two messages arrived in Amritsar, one from Robert Montgomery at Lahore and the other from an exhausted young bandsman of the 46th BNI who had ridden through the night the full 80 miles from Sialkote. Both, however, said the same thing. Montgomery wrote of the uprising at Sialkote, but M’Dougal, the bandsman, came with the proof. He had with him a hurried letter from M’Mahon, the civil officer at Sialkote, and it read in point,

“The troops here are in open mutiny; jail broke. Brigadier wounded. Bishop killed. Many have escaped to the fort. Bring the moveable column at once if possible. 6 1/2 am, July 9.

Within hours of receiving the message, Nicholson first disarmed the left wing of the 9th Bengal Light Cavalry. “…their commandant was taking a roll-call of his men in ‘Hindustani dress ‘— that is, without arms or uniform. Before them drew up into line a company of the 52nd Foot, with rifles loaded and bayonets fixed. Major Baker explained to his troopers the circumstances which compelled the general to disarm them. A party from each troop was then ordered to collect the arms left piled as usual outside the tents. In the marching orders issued that afternoon, the horses of the 9th Cavalry,’ were to accompany the column; the disarmed and dismounted troopers being left behind under guard of a company of the 52nd, and three of Bourchier’s gun.”

The same day, Nicholson marched out of Amritsar in the direction of Gurdaspur. The Sialkote mutineers were reportedly marching on that station, possibly in the hope of raising the irregulars stationed there and making a junction with the 4th BNI detachments from Kangra and Nurpur. Along the way, they hoped perhaps to meet the 46th BNI from Jhelum – instead, on the 12th of July, they would find John Nicholson and the Moveable Column at Trimmu Ghat.

^{Sources:
Behan, T. L., ed. Bulletins and Other State Intelligence for the Year 1857. Part 2. London: Harrison and Sons, 1858.
Bourchier, George. Eight Months’ Campaign against the Bengal Sepoy Army, during the Mutiny of 1857. London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1858.
Cave-Browne, J. The Punjab and Delhi in 1857. Vol. 2. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1861.
Cooper, Frederick. The Crisis in the Punjab, from the 10th of May until the Fall of Delhi. London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1858.
Forrest, G. W. The Life of Sir Neville Chamberlain. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1909.
Gimlette, G. H. D. A Postscript to the Records of the Indian Mutiny. London: H. F. & G. Witherby, 1927.
Kaye, John William. A History of the Sepoy War in India, 1857–1858. Vol. 2. London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1880.
Papers Relating to the Mutiny in the Punjab in 1857. London: Printed by Order of the House of Commons, 1859.
Trotter, Lionel J. The Life of John Nicholson: Soldier and Administrator. London: John Murray, 1897.}

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