At Allahabad, Lord Canning, who had set up his headquarters in the city in February 1858, well away from the machinations of Calcutta, received the news from Azamgarh with trepidation. The fight for Lucknow had but recently been won, and Sir Hugh Rose was making waves in Central India, but both Sir Colin Campbell and Sir Hugh were still too tied up with their own affairs to be spared for a march to retake Azamgarh. As it was, no one had taken Kunwar Singh into consideration, and he now stood on the brink of victory, within distance of Benares and what was worse, with an army large enough to shift control of the road between Cawnpore and Allahabad back into rebel hands.

It was critical, therefore, to relieve Milman at Azamgarh and put Kunwar Singh to flight – the question was, who was available to do it?
For Lord Canning, the question answered itself for at Allahabad was HM’s 13th Regiment (The Prince Albert’s Somersetshire, Light Infantry was raised in 1685, served in India from 1824 to 1847, 1857 to 1864 and from 1893. Their Indian honours are Afghanistan, Ghaznee, Jallalabad, and Cabool 1842) and their somewhat eccentric colonel, Lord Mark Kerr. While all of Oudh was shouting for reinforcements, the right wing of this regiment had been languishing in India since October 1857. Kerr had been instrumental in having the regiment removed from South Africa for duty in India; the badgering paid off, and they set sail on 20 August. They arrived in Calcutta just as Sir Colin Campbell was putting together his force for the relief of the Lucknow Residency, and there seemed no reason why the 13th should not accompany him to Lucknow. However, fate had other things in store for the regiment.

“It had been Sir Colin Campbell’s intention to entrust to Lord Mark Kerr the command of a column of all arms to disarm the mutineers of the 32nd Native Infantry Regiment in the Raneegunge district, and Lord Mark went to see the Commander-in-Chief on the subject on 13th October, when he mentioned to the Chief that his men were not yet provided with spare soles and heels for their boots. This intelligence was evidently displeasing to Sir Colin Campbell, for on the following day Lord Mark learnt that he had been superseded in the command of the column by Colonel Barker, R.A.; but worse was to follow, for on the 15th, when the headquarters wing of the Regiment was entraining, Lord Canning, the Governor-General, and Sir Colin Campbell came to the station to see them off-Sir Colin greeted Lord Mark with a smile, but the latter passed the Commander-in- Chief without looking at him, and later on when Sir Colin engaged him in conversation, the only replies he made were ‘Yes ‘ and ‘ No. ‘ Lord Mark admits in his journal that he was ‘ most imprudent’, and the sequel shows it. The troops reached Raniganj the same day; Colonel Barker arrived on the following day, the 16th, and took command of the column, which consisted of the Wing of the 13th, a battery of artillery, two companies of the Madras Rifles and a troop of the Bengal Yeomanry Cavalry, altogether about 1,000 strong. It was originally intended that the column should march to Sooruy to disarm the 32nd Native Infantry, but this was rendered unnecessary as on the 22nd, the greater part of the 32nd marched into Raniganj and laid down their arms.
On the 26th October, the column commenced its march to the North-West Provinces. On the 28th, two companies of the Regiment, under Captain H. M. Jones, with the Yeomanry Cavalry, were detached in pursuit of some mutinous sepoys of the 32nd, thus leaving Lord Mark with three companies barely sufficient to provide an escort for the guns. At the end of the day’s march, Sir Colin Campbell with his staff overtook the column, when he sent for Lord Mark and asked him courteously enough how his regiment was getting on. Lord Mark replied, ‘I cannot tell how it is, for I see very little of it…I’ve got no wing here, only an escort for artillery.‘ Sir Colin explained that he had to put Colonel Barker in command as being the senior officer and that he did not wish to hurt anyone’s feelings. Lord Mark maintained that Colonel Barker was a Captain in the same camp at Sevastopol when he commanded a regiment, and that Sir Colin had promised him the command of the column at Calcutta. They parted, and Sir Colin proceeded on his journey, but it was the common belief among the officers of the Regiment that the Regiment lost their chance of taking part in the final relief of Lucknow in consequence.”

For the 13th, it was a sore blow. Lord Mark had hoped Sir Henry Havelock would see his old regiment at Lucknow, but that would never come to pass; Havelock died, and the 13th marched to Allahabad. They then heard of the fighting at Cawnpore in December; once again, Lord Mark urged Colonel Barker to send the 13th, but Barker refused. Instead, on 7 December, they received orders to march to Fatehpur, where they once again halted. Colonel Barker made a punitive expedition, on orders from Sir Colin, to take Koth, a village on the Jamuna River; they then resumed their march to Cawnpore to join the main body of Campbell’s army. Once again, Lord Mark urged Sir Colin to allow the 13th to proceed with the army to Lucknow, and once again, he was rebuked and told he must wait for the left wing of the regiment to arrive. These had been left behind in South Africa and would not arrive in Calcutta until January. As it was, the headquarters and three companies of the 13th had their Christmas in Cawnpore and were then relegated to escort duty to take 23 captured guns and some 200 wounded and sick men back to Allahabad.

“On the 8th February, the Commander-in – Chief, Sir Colin Campbell, arrived at Allahabad to confer with the Governor-General. The 13th furnished a guard of honour, and in the afternoon Lord Mark had another interview with the Chief. The former tells us in his journal that he spoke to Sir Colin for half an hour more strongly, he suspects , than the latter is accustomed to hear, urging the claims of the Regiment to proceed to the front and concludes: ‘ I tell him I have claims for my service and family, and that I have the blood of Wellington, Napier, Marlborough, and Schomberg.’ It was of no avail; the Commander-in-Chief would not give way.

By the 10th of February, the 13th’s band, which had been with the left wing, arrived in Allahabad, but quite obviously without the left wing. They had been sequestered, immediately upon arriving in Calcutta for active service, and headed directly for Benares. From there, on 18 February, with 100 men of the Madras Rifles, they marched to Azamgarh. Adding to its number a few sowars of irregular cavalry and two guns, manned by men of the 13th who had trained as gunners, this small force, under Major Cox, would eventually reinforce the Sarun Field Force to share in their fights and fortunes.

Lord Mark Kerr Receives His Orders

With the news of the Azamgarh disaster now openly known in Allahabad, Lord Canning sent Major Birch to confer with Lord Mark in the afternoon to ask him, quite simply, how soon he could march to Azamgarh? Without hesitation, Kerr replied, “In a couple of hours,” and true to his word, at 7.30 that same evening, on 27 March, he started for Benares. The headquarters of the 13th and the companies commanded by Captain H.M. Jones, Captain E. Boyd and Lieutenant V. Gilbert proceeded in bullock carts, while Captain W.H. Jones’ company and the band were embarked on a steamer to take the river route. The bullock dak arrived on the 29th, but owing to snags on the way, the steamer would not arrive until the 31st. At Benares, fresh orders were waiting for Lord Mark from Sir Colin Campbell — he was not to engage the enemy until Sir Edward Lugard, who had been dispatched with some haste with a force of all arms, from Lucknow, arrived. However, Lord Mark saw things differently.

His column had swelled, not prodigiously but to some standing, to include a troop of the 2nd Dragoon Guards (Bays) with 2 officers and 55 men, the Royal Artillery contributed two 6-pounders, two 5 1/2 inch mortars with 1 officer and 17 men, while HM’s 13th boasted of 19 officers and 372 men. In his estimation, while he might not be able to take Azamgarh, he could certainly discomfit the rebels. On 2 April, the column left Benares, their tail a long line of ammunition carts and supplies (312 carts, 11 elephants and 20 camels!) intended for Azamgarh, and by 5 April, they had reached Sarsena, just eight miles outside Azamgarh. While his men settled themselves down for a well-earned rest, Kerr was accosted by letters from Azamgarh. A staff officer on Colonel Dame’s force first informed Kerr of the Dames’ rather unfortunate sortie; then he urged Kerr to proceed to Azamgarh and finally that he should do so, without a moment’s delay. As tempting as the prospect of instant battle was, Lord Mark was neither a fool nor was he suicidal. He understood his limitations – his men were tired, the rains had decided to turn parts of the country into a swamp, he had no personal knowledge of the road ahead of him, and, except for the panicked missives of a staff officer, he had no assurance that the rebel force in Azamgarh only amounted to 5000 men. For all he knew, it might be 15’000. Instead, he let his men sleep and ordered that they were to be roused for a 4 am start.
Shortly before dawn on 6 April, Lord Mark took the lead, accompanied by a party of the Bays, and his guide, Edward Venables (who had left Franks’ force and returned to Azamgarh), his men following on behind in marching order. For the next two hours, they met no one, not a rebel, not a fire, even the very villages they passed seemed to be deserted. Unnerving as it was, Lord Mark did not let his guard down. Over to his left was a tope of mango trees and a few buildings, just off the road a little way ahead. He halted the head of the column to allow the transport to close up and, with his telescope, took a closer look at not only the buildings but the trees. While it all seemed quiet, both positions were very much alive with armed sepoys. Then, sweeping his glass around to the right, he saw that the banked ditches that lined the very road he was on were likewise crowded with armed men, prepared for the perfect ambush.
Kerr now waited patiently for the infantry and the endless baggage train to come up. As soon as the carts, elephants and camels had closed in, he ordered Captain Boyd’s company to advance, in skirmishing order on the right of the road to clear the ditches, with the Cavalry on their right and slightly to the rear, to turn the left of the rebel position. Boyd quickly cleared the first row of ditches and drove the rebels into the second line, but by now the rebels in the trees and in the buildings off to the left were very much awake and had opened fire. To Lord Mark’s consternation, a number of them, quite unobserved, from a few enclosures in the rear of the column, were firing on the baggage. The situation was rapidly becoming very serious.
“Captain H. Jones’s company, Lieutenant Everett’s and Lieutenant Gilbert’s companies threw out skirmishers to the left of the road and were soon hotly engaged, while Lieutenant Hall, who had been sent with a subdivision to support Captain Boyd, was soon dangerously wounded. The two guns under Lieutenant Robertson had opened fire on the enemy opposing Boyd’s company. The firing continued for some time without producing any effect on the enemy’s position.”
At this juncture, Lord Mark received word that his baggage convoy had retired further to the rear, but some of the drivers had now bolted from terror, and the remainder with their animals were threatening to flee, having become all but unmanageable from the first sound of musketry – he quickly sent Lieutenant Stewart of the 13th with 15 men of the Bays to restore order. Stewart was told to defend the baggage at all costs; how he was to do it was left up to him. For the next hour, Kerr managed to repulse not just repeated attacks on his baggage, but also from the rear and both flanks. However, he was still no closer to making an impression on the rebels. Word came from the baggage train that holding it further was impossible, but Kerr sent word back to Major Tyler, commanding the rear-guard, to hold his own, come what may: the rebels pushed forward and managed to set fire to a few carts, but were speedily repulsed by the Bays.

Until now, Lord Mark had not used his artillery, and with the rebel reserves forming up in quarter-distance columns, and dispatching from their right a compact column with the obvious intent of not only mowing him down but taking his baggage, Lord Mark pushed forward the two 6-pounders within sixty yards of the main building, only to find that the enthusiasm of the gunners had brought the guns too far forward and the shelling was ineffective. Ordering them to pull back a short distance, they recommenced shelling the buildings, this time with better effect, pounding a small breach into the outer walls. Some forty volunteers rushed forward to storm it, but they quickly found not only was the breach not practicable, but directly behind it was another wall; they made an attempt to enlarge the existing hole with their bayonets, but on orders from Kerr, turned their attention to the wooden parts of the building, which they promptly set on fire before falling back. The artillery recommenced its bombardment, but this time with only one gun – the other was being used to prevent the rebels from entertaining notions of taking the baggage. Meanwhile, the burning building was proving to be a bit too much for the rebels who still happened to be inside – these now rushed out, and Lord Mark was waiting for them. The Bays were sent to the front, and as they dashed out into the open, it was to meet the Dragoon swords. While this was indeed optimistic, and enough space had been cleared for a further advance, it did not stop the attack on the rear. The rebels had made a rush for and seized an embankment that lined the road and from which, with relative safety, could pour a ceaseless fire on the rear – Captain Wilson Jones rallied his men to make a charge and taking the lead, the 13th rushed the embankment, with Jones ever in the fore, until a bullet met its purpose; as Jones fell, the 13th took the embankment and the rebels scattered.

The battle had now reached a peculiar moment. Lord Mark had effectively pierced the rebel centre, and the road to Azamgarh was laid open to him; on the left, the rebels who had been sent flying from the burning buildings were falling back with all haste, but on the right, they were still causing no end of trouble, and in the rear, things were still looking grim. Lord Mark, still mindful of the fact that his goal was Azamgarh, resolved to leave a sufficient force to deal with the rebels on the right while he, with the main body, would push forward to the town, in the hope he might find someone there willing to help him with the baggage. Telling Major Tayler to hold the rebels in check as best he could, he set his nose towards Azamgarh. However, this seems to have been a bit more than the rebels anticipated; seeing Kerr advancing, they suddenly upped and ran – with their departure, “…the drivers of the convoy, seeing the enemy retreating, returned to their bullocks, and thus the convoy was enabled to follow the main body on the way to Azimghur about 2 miles distant. The elephants carrying the tents had bolted altogether, and some five or six carts were burnt, including the orderly room cart which contained the Regimental Records.” The day, however, was not quite won.

The advance did not meet any opposition – the rebels were not waiting for a replay of the day’s action, and were seen retreating with all haste, abandoning village after village that lined the road; by 11 in the morning, Lord Mark reached the Bridge of Boats that should have led him across the river and directly to the jail. The bridge, as was to be expected, had been damaged, and the rebels took one last opportunity to line the high ground on the other side of the river, to take shots at Kerr’s force as they waited with some impatience for someone to come up with a solution. Lord Mark sent a message to Colonel Dames in the entrenchment to send forward some men of the 37th and the Madras Rifles, while Lieutenant Colomb made such repairs to the bridge to make it passable. Meanwhile, two guns from the entrenchment and some skirmishers of the 13th quickly ended the rebel aspirations, and these quite quickly disappeared from the riverbank. With Dames’ men bringing up the convoy and Venables at his side, Lord Mark Kerr entered the entrenchment.

Of course, congratulations were in order and the Regimental Orders of the 13th read,

“7th April 1858. “The Commanding Officer congratulates the 2nd Dragoon Guards, Royal Artillery, and Headquarters 13th Light Infantry, on the result of their action of yesterday. It shows what the power of discipline over numbers is. For two hours, our small force — 500 combatants protecting a convoy two miles in length was completely surrounded by probably 10,000 of the enemy, in a position of great strength, on our direct line of advance. After two hours of courageous endurance, discipline, which enables brave men to bide their time, carried the day, and the 10,000 fled, pell-mell, in utter rout. Lord Mark Kerr tells Major Tyler, Lieutenant Ormsby, 2nd Dragoon Guards, and Lieutenant Robertson, Royal Artillery and the officers, Non-commissioned officers and soldiers of each arm, that their steady obedience to orders and bravery have won, at this Azimghur, a battle which has not often been fought. Let them remember that it was no noisy enthusiasm which has done this, but courage-strengthened by discipline, that has given them the power to thrash an enemy in a strong position, probably twenty times their number and hidden in an ambuscade; excited too by their defeat of a British force only a few days ago. Let them remember these things, and that any odds are nothing against a disciplined English Army.”

Lord Canning was most impressed with Lord Mark’s victory, minor though it was, and could not help but write in the most complimentary terms.

DEAR LORD MARK KERR, – ‘Allahabad, 13th April 1858

I received your first report of your success, written on the 6th instant, with great satisfaction damped only by the sad loss which your fine Regiment has so unhappily, but unavoidably sustained.
I have now seen your fuller and more detailed account of the whole affair. It is most clearly and simply given. I congratulate you upon the success with which you met and broke through a formidable opposition. Gallantry and skilful arrangement were both needed in the circumstances in which you found yourself, and officers and men have shown unmistakably that neither were wanting. It has been a matter of regret to me that the 13th have, hitherto, had so little share in active operations; and I am proportionately rejoiced that upon the first occasion offering, the Corps should so greatly have distinguished itself.

I am & c.
CANNING.

The “sad losses” referred to by Lord Canning were, for such a small battle, terrible.

Headquarters HM’s 13th Light Infantry
Captain Wilson Henry Jones – killed. Aged 27. Third son of Wilson Jones, Esq., of Hartsheath, Flintshire, North Wales.
Subaltern Lieutenant H. Edward Hall was wounded dangerously through the back

Privates
Amos, George – killed in action
Brown, William – killed in action
Clayburn, William – killed in action
Collins, Thomas – killed in action
Connell, Patrick – killed in action
Connelly, Terrence – slightly wounded
Crawford, Edward – dangerously wounded. Died of wounds, 8 April
Cross, Alexander – slightly wounded
Dineffe, Thomas – slightly wounded
Dobbyns, Thomas – slightly wounded
Grimsditch, Isaac- slightly wounded
Harris, Richard – severely wounded
Higgins, James – severely wounded
Maher, Thomas – slightly wounded
Milnes, Benjamin – severely wounded
Moran, Patrick – severely wounded
Napier, William – slightly wounded
Orchard, James- slightly wounded
Power, Thomas – severely wounded
Ryan, Patrick – slightly wounded
Seymour, Jacob – severely wounded
Simms, Alfred – severely wounded
Smith, Robert – dangerously wounded, died of wounds
Staywell, George – killed in action
Stewart, John – killed in action
Sutton, John – dangerously wounded, died of wounds, 10 April
Thompson, Thomas – slightly wounded
Warwick, John – slightly wounded
Wilson, Thomas – killed in action
Wirted, Michael – severely wounded
Witherow, Joseph – slightly wounded
Young, George H. – severely wounded.

In all, 9 privates were killed, 2 sergeants and 18 privates wounded.

Detachment 2nd Dragoon Guards
Corporal W. Walls – killed in action
8 horses killed and missing
3 privates severely wounded
2 privates slightly wounded

Captain Jones and the others were brought in from the field and buried in a garden, with Lord Mark reading the funeral service over the graves of the Church of England men and Lieutenant, the Hon. James C. Dormer over the Roman Catholics. At a later date, a stone cross was erected by the 13th Regiment with the following inscription:

In memory of Captain Wilson, H. Jones and Privates William Brown, William Claybyn, Thomas Collins, Patrick Connell, George Staywell, John Stewart, Thomas Wilson, Edward Crawford, Robert Smith, John Sutton, George Amos, 1st Battalion, 13th Light Infantry. All were killed or died of wounds received in action at the Relief of Azamgarh on the 6th April 1858.

The question, however, remained. What had Lord Mark Kerr achieved? The answer, without hesitation, should be, just enough. He had succeeded in reinforcing the entrenchment, but his force, even with the Madras Rifles and the 37th, was not equal in number to the rebels under Kunwar Singh, who still held Azamgarh, so the siege, in effect, continued.

On 8 April, on the request of Colonel Cumberlege, who was approaching Azamgarh with a convoy and had found himself in difficulties, Lord Mark Kerr set out with 150 men of the 13th, 100 of the 37th, a troop of the Bays and Lieutenant Walsh with 2 of his guns; they proceeded 10 miles up the Ghazipur Road and halted. The next morning, they were joined by the colonel with detachments of HM’s 10th, 37th and 97th regiments, a number of the Madras Rifles and the 6th Madras Cavalry. Thus consolidated, they proceeded towards Azamgarh. Except for some minor skirmishing at the Bridge of Boats and one man wounded, they arrived at the entrenchment without incident. Lord Mark now took Sir Colin Campbell’s orders rather more seriously and did not engage the rebels again. For their part, they kept up a nearly ceaseless fire on the entrenchment, but their minds were obviously occupied in another direction. From Lucknow, Brigadier Edward Lugard was fast approaching, and they began constructing breastworks to give him a warm welcome.

Then, without warning, on 14 April, Kunwar Singh and the greater part of his troops abandoned Azamgarh. The British sprang into action, but it was for nought.

“Colonel Dames ordered Colonel Cumberlege to march in pursuit with the headquarters of the 13th, 2 guns and the 6th Madras Cavalry and to prevent them crossing the River Ganges. According to Lord Mark, Colonel Cumberlege was ‘ a good man but mighty slow’. On the 15th, the column reached Mau, having lost touch with the enemy, 30 miles from Azimghur, where they were joined by Major Carr and some Madras Rifles from Ghazipur, and remained halted. On 17th April, news was received from Azimghur that the enemy had attacked the entrenchments, but that on the arrival of Colonel E. Lugard’s force, the enemy had fled.”

This, however, is hardly the end of the story of Kunwar Singh, and we shall now, for a brief moment, leave Lord Mark Kerr and turn our attentions to Brigadier Edward Lugard.

^{Sources:
Ball, Charles – The History of the Indian Mutiny, Vol II (The London Printing & Publishing Company, Ltd.)
Behan, T.L. – Bulletins & Other State Intelligence for the Year 1858, Part III (London: Harrison & Sons, 1860)
Blunt, E. A. H. – List of Inscriptions on Christian Tombs & Tables of Historical Interest in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh (Allahabad: Government Press, 1911)
Dodd, George – The History of the Indian Revolt and the Expedition of Persia, China & Japan (London: W.&R. Chambers, 1859)
Everett, Sir Henry – The History of the Somerset Light Infantry (Prince Albert’s) 1685 – 1914 (London: Methuen & Co., 1934)
Malleson, Col. G. B. – Ambushes and Surprises (London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1885)
Malleson, Col. G.B. – History of the Indian Mutiny 1857-1858, Vol II (London: William H. Allen & Co., 1879)}