In January 1858, Colonel Thomas Seaton was appointed Brigadier and posted to the 3rd Brigade in Campbell’s Army of Oudh – a just reward for his efforts to bring supplies to Fatehgarh. With a gladdened heart, Seaton was blissfully making plans to accompany Sir Colin Campbell to Lucknow. However, he had not reckoned with the plans of the Commander-in-Chief.
Sir Colin, finally convinced he needed to retake Lucknow before he could tackle not only Rohilkhand but the entire Oudh province, was finding himself in something of a quandary. He had a bevvy of officers, many of whom had but recently arrived in India and were looking for employment, preferably where the fighting would be the thickest, but he found he could not use them. After the near-disaster presented to him by Windham in December, where, as an experienced Crimea officer, he had nearly lost Cawnpore due to a lack of “India” skills, Sir Colin was wary of unseasoned European officers. This left him with a problem of who would take over Fatehgarh when he was gone, and his decision fell on Seaton. On 22 January, he called Seaton to his tent to tell him the galling news.
In his usual brisk manner, Sir Colin informed Seaton he planned to “form a district to be called Futtygurh District. It was to comprise Futtygurh, Mynpooree, Etawah and Meerunka-Serai on the
Grand Trunk Road, and as I was the only brigadier he had who could speak the language and
manage the natives, he was obliged to appoint me to the command, &c.” Crestfallen, Seaton, with “bitterness in my heart”, decided to look on the disappointment with as much “patience and resignation” as he could find and tried to find something positive in being given an “abominable command, ” in “a district as large as four ordinary English counties to protect from rebels, and to keep in order a river-front to the east, along which were aligned large bodies of mutineers, who might at any moment cross and set the whole country once more in a ferment.“
He would also have the dependents of the former Nawab of Fatehgarh to contend with, who were stirring up revolt to the north of the district, and then, if that was not enough to deal with, Seaton had the whole line of the Jamuna River towards the west, which consisted of “one huge network of ravines – a perfect maze, the usual biding place of all the ruffians and outlaws in the district.” While he could have dealt with ruffians and a band of revolted sepoys at Koochla on the Ganges, Seaton was more concerned with the 15’000 rebel and the remnants of the Gwalior artillery and cavalry, who had made their way to Aliganj, barely seven miles from Fatehgarh; if intelligence served him correctly, they had constructed a practical bridge of boats there to cross uninterrupted into the country between the Ramganga and the Ganges and if they were so inclined, wreak havoc across the Doab. If the fates were on their side, they could even take back a portion of the Grand Trunk Road, the only communication line open with Delhi and Agra.

Optimistic by nature, Seaton might not found even these difficulties insurmountable, but to add to his disappointment, Sir Colin Campbell was leaving him holding the fort without enough men to even keep the gates closed.
In his generosity, Sir Colin Campbell was leaving behind HM’s 82nd Regiment, the 7th Punjab Infantry Regiment, a field battery of nine guns under Major Smith of the Royal Artillery, and some 350 horsemen, all raw levies, who also happened to be at Mainpuri. A small body of civilians was being trained up as cavalry at Fatehgarh, but the only horsemen Seaton had at his immediate disposal were his own personal escort of six men of Hodson’s Horse. A few engineers completed Seaton’s Fatehgarh force.
“On talking over the command with Sir Colin, he said, in reference to the large body of troops at Alagunge, that he should ‘do something’ about them, but, for some reason best known to himself, he did nothing at all, though he could have driven them to the four winds in two hours. The day before he marched, Sir Colin said to me—’ You’ll be mobbed, my dear friend, as soon as I leave, but you must hold out till I come back. You must push on the repairs of the fort, and the defensive measures that are in progress outside, and indent at once on Agra for ammunition for your guns.’ “
Of course, what Sir Colin meant by “mobbed” was not lost on Seaton – the Commander in Chief expected Seaton to be besieged at Fatehgarh as soon as his back was turned. Seaton looked at the situation pragmatically – if the rebels crossed the river and besieged Fatehgarh, he could not be blamed; if he managed to keep them at bay and made a success of the defence, the credit would be his. Afterall, Seaton was no stranger to sieges – he had survived Jallalabad during the Afghan war and had gained valuable experience from it – Fatehgarh did not seem impossible. Provided Agra sent on the ammunition promptly, there was no reason why he could not hold out.
However, Sir Colin Campbell was not a fool – he understood Seaton’s position would be precarious in the extreme; to provide him some relief, although it would be slow in coming, Sir John Lawrence agreed to raise a force, the Roorkee Field Force, under Colonel Jones (60th Rifles) whose main duty would be enter Rohilkhand from the northwest and occupy the rebels attention away from Fatehgarh, however, they would not be ready to march until the first week of February. Sir Colin Campbell could no longer delay taking Lucknow – by 23 February, the last of the Army of Oudh, with Seaton’s dear friend William Hodson in tow, had left Fatehgarh, and Seaton was well and truly on his own.
Considering the size of this new district he had to protect, besides all the river crossings, Seaton dispatched two companies of the 82nd under Lieutenant Colonel Watson to Mainpuri to keep open communication with Agra; they were also held in readiness to relieve the 3rd Europeans, who had been ordered to escort the Agra civilians, mainly women and children, to Allahabad. This particular duty was completed on 18 February – the 82nd then returned to Mainpuri, having in their turn been relieved by the Rifle Brigade. This detachment of the 82nd would become part of a small moveable column, with a squadron of Alexander’s Horse and the 7th Punjab Infantry.