Ahead of his column, Brigadier-General John Nicholson arrived. After taking counsel with General Wilson, he returned to the column and on the 14th of August, he marched into the camp with his men.

The column consisted of

Captain Bouchier’s European Horse Battery
HM’s 52nd Light Infantry
Detachment of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry
The remaining wing of HM’s 61st Regiment of Foot
The 2nd Regiment of Punjab Infantry and 250 Multani horsemen.

The Multani Horse were men brought down from the frontier by Nicholson himself. They came out of personal loyalty to Nicholson, took no pay from the government and recognised no one as their leader but Nicholson. Mounted on their wiry hill ponies, they had
“…surrounded the column like a web; they rode in couples, each couple within signalling distance of the other, and so circled the column round for many a mile…” 19-year-old Reginald Wilberforce, who had ridden with the moveable column all the way to Delhi, had never seen anything like it, nor did he himself have anything but awe for Nicholson.

Standing over 6’2″, with a long black beard, strong of body and laconic of speech, Nicholson stood as a mountain among men. Frederick Roberts was moved to say Nicholson impressed him “more profoundly” than any man he had ever met and doubted he would ever meet one like him again. When he strode into camp on the 14th of August, a perceptible change came over the Ridge. For the first time since the start of the siege, the men suddenly felt they had a leader; if anyone could put an end to this awful stalemate, it was Nicholson.
He did not, however, impress everyone. At their first meeting at Hindu Rao’s House, Major Charles Reid disliked him intensely.
“I had never seen him before in my life. And I thought I had never seen a man I disliked so much at first sight. His haughty manner and peculiar sneer I could not stand. He asked several questions relevant to the enemy’s position and then moved on. Baird Smith was with me at the time…I complained of Nicholson’s overbearing manner. He replied, “Yes, but it wears off. I’m sure you’ll like him when you have seen him more.” Like many others, he would change his mind about the formidable soldier.

Like him or not, Nicholson was a force to be reckoned with. His overpowering presence had served him well through many lonely years on the wild frontiers and had won him the respect of the lawless tribes. One such set of men had even gone so far as to turn Nicholson into a living god, a deity they worshipped regardless of how he treated them. Called Nikelseyns, the cult embarrassed and infuriated Nicholson – it is anyone’s guess what he would have felt were he to know the last worshipper died in Abbottabad in 2004.

Dauntingly, Nicholson was followed everywhere by his very imposing Pathan orderly who was as little prone to smiling as Nicholson himself. He stood behind Nicholson’s chair in the mess tent, a cocked pistol in one hand while he served Nicholson with the other. With Nicholson in the room, there was little time for mirth -as everyone quickly surmised for a man of his disposition, war was not a laughing matter.

A masterful man in his own right, Sir John Lawrence found Nicholson difficult to work with, and it did not take Nicholson very long to fluster the already very undecided General Wilson. By now, nearly everyone was exasperated with Wilson. Baird Smith had initially found the man rather amusing but by August, after weeks of putting up with Wilson’s “fidgety fits” through which Baird Smith had had to soothe him like one comforts a child, he was finding Wilson a bore, “peevish and positively so childish...He combines a wonderous amount of ignorance and obstinacy. He is the most obstructive being ever created…” wrote Baird Smith to his wife, “and gets in a towering rage with me because I keep harping on about the necessity for an assault.” Wilson finally stopped speaking to Baird Smith altogether, insisting that all communication be done through his staff.
Nicholson was not having any of it, and his anger with Wilson’s fretting about attacking Delhi did not need months to boil over. In a letter to John Lawrence, he threatened that he would write to the military authorities and have Wilson replaced. As Nicholson would have been the obvious choice as the replacement, he proposed Campbell of the 52nd to prevent anyone from thinking he was motivated by personal reasons. It would have been a coup d’état which Nicholson was perfectly capable of instigating had Wilson not backed down. Nicholson had come to take Delhi, and Wilson could follow or not. Th

Najafgarh

Ridge Force, Commander Brigadier General John Nicholson.

Cavalry
HM 9th Lancers. Capt. Henry Sarel, No. 3 Sqn only. (100). Guides Cavalry. Capt. Charles Sanford, 3rd BLC. 1 x sqn. (120).Mooltanee Horse. Lt. J. B. Lind, 24th BNI. Sikh Irregulars. (80). Note: Capt. Sarel had overall command of the cavalry.

Infantry
HM 61st Regiment – Lt-Col. Henry Rainey. (320).1st Bengal Fusiliers – Maj. George Jacob. (280).1st Punjaub Infantry (Coke’s Rifles) – Lt. Wm. Lumsden. (400). 2nd (Green’s) Punjaub Infantry. – Capt. George Green. (300). Composite Rear-guard and Reserve Battalion – Capt. Alexander Gordon. 100 men each from HM 61st, 1st Bengal Fusiliers and 2nd Punjaub Infantry.(300). 

Artillery
Tombs’ Troop, 2nd Tp/1st Bde., Bengal Horse Artillery – Maj. Harry Tombs. 4 x 6-pdrs.
Remmington’s Troop, 1st Tp/1st Bde., Bengal Horse Artillery – Capt. Frederick Remmington. 5 x 6-pdrs, 1 x 12-pdr howitzer.
Blunt’s Troop, 2nd Tp/3rd Bde., Bengal Horse Artillery – Capt. Charles Blunt. 5 x 9-pdrs, 1 x 12/24-pdr howitzer.

Engineers, Sappers & Miners.
Lt. Maximilian Geneste – Detachment only. (30).

Baggage Guard
2nd Punjaub Cavalry – Lt. Charles Nicholson. 1 x sqn. (80).
Mooltanee Horse – Lt. Caulfield. Sikh Irregulars. (120).

The Rebel Force:

Comd: General Bakht Khan

Total Force:
7,000 Infantry, 1,000 cavalry and 13 guns. Note that Nicholson’s attack fell primarily on the Neemuch Brigade. Much of the Rohilkhund Brigade failed to support its sister formation in any meaningful way.

Neemuch Brigade.
1st Bengal Light Cavalry; one wing only. Kotah Contingent Cavalry (4 x tps).72nd Bengal Native Infantry, 7th Infantry Gwalior Contingent, Kotah Contingent Infantry.4th Tp/1st Bde., Bengal Horse Artillery.

Rohilkhand Brigade.
8th Bengal Irregular Cavalry.18th, 28th, 29th and 69th Bengal Native Infantry. No. 6 Coy/8th Bn., with No 15 Light Field Battery, Bengal Artillery.

Other Cavalry.
13th Bengal Irregular Cavalry (elements only).14th Bengal Irregular Cavalry.

Other Artillery.
No. 3 Coy/7th Bn., with No. 5 Light Field Battery, Bengal Artillery.

Total Ordnance.
1 x 24-pdr howitzer, 2 x 12-pdr howitzers, 2 x 9-pdrs, 4 x 6-pdrs and 4 x small calibre brass guns (2 x 4-pdr, 2 x 3-pdr). The likelihood is that the 6-pdrs and perhaps one or two of the 12-pdr howitzers were fielded by the horse artillery troop of the Neemuch Brigade. The other distribution of guns is impossible even to guess at.

The news of the siege train making its way slowly from Ferozepore towards Delhi seemed like the perfect opportunity for the rebels to crush the British on the Ridge. Their objective was to take the siege train before it arrived in Delhi. For Bakht Khan, he could repair his somewhat diminished image if he could win a decisive victory over the now very irritating Europeans on the Ridge, and he intended to do so. From the Ridge, the British watched as the mutineers poured out of the city, no less than 9000 in number, with 18 guns. At daybreak the following morning, Nicholson was dispatched to follow them and force them into battle.
His force consisted of 2000 infantry and cavalry with sixteen horse artillery guns. As they left the Ridge, the rain was pouring down in torrents; by the time they reached the open country, the roads had turned into quagmires, and the land around them resembled a lake. Before reaching their first halt, only nine miles from camp, the artillery was already forced to put their shoulder to their guns, dragging, pushing and pulling their way through two swamps.

At Nangloi, Nicholson received intelligence of the movement of the enemy, and after a brief rest, he pushed his men on towards Najafgarh. Reaching shortly after 4 pm, they found the enemy occupying a position some three-quarters of a mile long, stretching from the bridge over the canal to Najafgarh town itself. Leaving the baggage behind under the guard of Multani Horse and a detachment of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, Nicholson crossed a ford which passed in front of the rebel lines.
The strongest position held by the rebels was an old walled garden or serai in which they had planted four guns while a further nine were established between the garden and the bridge. Within an hour, Nicholson’s men had crossed the ford, and he engaged the enemy. His plan was as follows:

“The serai being the first and chief point to be gained, in front of it were drawn up the European portion of the force, the 1st Bengal Fusiliers in the centre, HM’s 61st on the right, with Green’s Rifles on the left, some 800 men in all; Tomb’s and Remmington’s guns were on a slight ridge in advance, with the Guides in skirmishing order to keep down the enemy’s fire. The village of Nujuffghur beyond the serai, on our right, was consigned to Lumsden with Rifles (Coke’s), that on the left, which seemed more strongly occupied, was made over to Captain Blunt with four guns and a small detachment of cavalry, to watch till the infantry should be available for an attack.”

The reserve was composed of Blunt’s two remaining guns and the rest of the Mooltanees under Lieut. Lind. Nicholson advanced to the front of the line, whom he ordered to lie down, and thus addressed them;
“Men of the 61st, remember what Sir Colin Campbell said at Chillianwallah, and you have heard he said the same to his gallant Highland Brigade at the Alma: I have the same request to make of you and the men of the 1st Fusiliers. Hold your fire till within 20 yards or 30 yards; then fire and charge, and the serai is yours.”

Opening up briskly with artillery fire and forcing the rebel left centre, Nicholson gave the order for the main line to rise and advance. The men came on relentlessly, holding their fire as ordered until within 20 yards of the walls, when the order came to charge. Storming the serai, they carried the guns and then swept down the line of rebels towards the bridge. Under the cannonade and the determined onslaught of Nicholson’s men, the rebels fled in confusion, running leaderless towards the bridge into the open country on the other side, pursued relentlessly by Nicholson’s troops. In an action that lasted less than an hour, Nicholson had routed an army of 9000 men and captured 13 of their guns. Meanwhile, the 1st Punjab Infantry cleared out the town of Najafgarh, while the 1st Punjab Rifles were sent to deal with stragglers who were hiding in a nearby village. Here, at least, the rebels put up a sound resistance, forcing the Rifles back, their commandant shot dead, and a party of the 61st Foot was sent in to help. Even with the additional support, they could not clear the village; however, during the night, the rebels decided themselves to leave.

In their flight, the rebels only managed to save two of their guns. They left behind all their baggage, which included, oddly enough, an English buggy and a quantity of ladies’ dresses. Seventeen tumbrils of ammunition had to be abandoned for lack of transportation; the powder was blown up. The rest of the supplies, which could not be carried away, were burned. Nicholson then ordered the Najafgarh Bridge destroyed, and on the evening of the 26th, he marched his men back to Delhi. His casualties were two officers and twenty-three men killed, two officers and sixty-eight men wounded, and sixteen horses killed and four wounded.

Perhaps the outcome would have been different if the Rohilkhand Brigade had joined the Neemuch Brigade in the fight -as it was, they were a few miles in the rear and either unwilling or unable to move forward. It was a damning loss for the rebels, and worse was yet to come.

^Sources:

<sup>History of the Siege of Delhi by an Officer Who Served There – W.W. Ireland (1861)
The Indian Mutiny of 1857 – Colonel G.B. Malleson, C.S.I. (1891)
An Unrecorded Chapter of the Indian Mutiny – Reginald G. Wilberforce (1894)
With HM’ 9th Lancers During the Indian Mutiny – the Letters of Brevet Major O.H.G.S Anson – edited by his son, Harcourt S. Anson ( 1896)
The Siege of Delhi in 1857, A Short Account – compiled by Major-General A.G. Handcock C.B. (1897)
Forty-One Years in India Vol I – Field Marshal Lord Roberts (1897)

Delhi-1857 – edited by General Sir Henry Wylie Norman and Mrs Keith Young (1902)
Delhi Past and Present – H.C: Fanshawe, C.S.I. (1902)
A History of the Indian Mutiny – T. Rice Holmes (1904)
Richard Baird Smith – the Leader of the Delhi Heroes in 1857 – Colonel H.M. Vibart, R.E. (1907)
A Narrative of the Siege of Delhi – Charles John Griffiths (1910)
The Punjab and Delhi in 1857 Vol II- Rev. J. Cave-Browne M.A. (1911)
The Indian Mutiny of 1857 – A Sketch of Principal Military Events – Captain F.R. Sedgwick, Royal Field Artillery (Reprinted 1919)
The Red Fort – An Account of the Siege of Delhi – James Leasor (1956)
Delhi in 1857 – N.K. Nigam, M.A. (1957)
The Great Mutiny, India 1857 – Christopher Hibbert (1980)
The Siege of Delhi -Mutiny Memories of an Old Officer – Richard Barter, (London, the Folio Society, 1984)</sup>

^{Troops who took part in the Battle of Najafgarh with thanks to:
https://irondukeminiatures.co.uk/1857-campaigns-and-orbats-2}