The 7th of September

Things now came to a head.
After the departure of the Mhow and Indore men, the Contingent demanded to know what plans, if any, Scindia had for them? They were promptly invited to a garden party in the palace grounds – all the officers and some 300 sepoys came at Scindia’s call. Taking his dangerous stratagem forward, Scindia asked the officers what it was exactly that they wanted? The officers formulated a reply, but the sepoys, who had had about as much politic as they could stomach, thrust their officers aside and told Scindia they had resolved to immediately take Agra and to destroy any Christians they found there. Once they had accomplished their objective, they would carry Scindia’s banner where he pleased.
He replied that, by their own showing, they did not wait for his orders; that their movement, until after the rains, would be against his will, and they should not receive from him neither pay nor supplies. The sepoys declared indignantly that they had been betrayed and, returning to their camp, planted a green flag for Mahomedans and a white flag for Hindus. Deputations invited Scindia’s troops to join them for their common objects. They wrote to pray the rebel force at Banda to come and crush him, and they prepared their batteries.”
One of Scindia’s corps was ripe for rebellion, and all save the Mahrattas of his troop seemed ready to join the green and white standards. If his own men rose, Scindia knew he would have no choice but to either become a puppet of the mutineers or flee Gwalior altogether. The smallest alarm, he knew, would set them off. To prevent any such mishaps, Scindia ordered all the bugles confiscated and placed men he could trust to watch the guns.
At daybreak, on 7 September, Scindia paraded his whole force.
He appealed to them corps by corps, it is said very touchingly, against the insulting coercion which the rebellious Contingent threatened. His own army, though in accord with the rebels in their feelings towards the British power, did not desire that he should be coerced by the Contingent, and on his addressing himself to his best-affected regiment of Gwalior men, that regiment declared enthusiastically for him. Then another corps, mainly of Gwalior men, did so. Of his two corps from our provinces, one was fully, one far “committed to the rebels. But both had Mahratta officers, and they also professed obedience. Scindia required that, in proof of it, one of these corps should give up the ringleaders of the defection to the green and white flags, and they gave up twenty men, whom he instantly placed in irons and in gaol. He promised daily batta to his troops and increased his irregular Thakoor levies from 6,000 to 11,000 men.”

In their turn, the rebels at once planted their batteries against Scindia and his palace. What they did not expect was Scindia would move to meet them.

“The Maharajah moved out his whole force, and himself placed every battery and picket, and arranged his Thakoor force. His spirit, and the adhesion of his troops, surprised the rebels. A portion of the Contingent cavalry, which had been for some time with him in a sort of neutral attitude, joined his ranks. He cut off the supplies of the rebels, and doubled his guards on the Chumbul to prevent the threatened return of the Mhow and Indore body from Dholepore. His emissaries sowed fresh dissensions. The 5th Eegiment, with which the rest had quarrelled on account of its killing some of the native officers who had led it to mutiny, and the men of the 6th Regiment offered to fight for him. The Banda force would not come to Gwalior. The Contingent lost heart; professed to be satisfied, after examining accounts, that they had received nearly all ‘ their own ‘ money deposited in Scindia’s treasury by the Political Agent and within six days withdrew their guns, while Scindia maintained his posts.”

Of course, it was not over yet.

Vakils sent by the Rani of Jhansi and Nana Sahib arrived once again in Gwalior and placed a high bid for the services of the Contingent. ” If they would join the Nana Saheb at Cawnpoor, settling Jhansi and Jaloun for him by the way, the Nana’s Vakeel promised to all high pay, while he conferred brigadierships and ensigncies by the dozen; and finally the rebels asked leave of Scindia to go to Bundelcund and Cawnpoor, instead of to Agra which he could but promise about the 23rd of September.” The leaders within the Contingent suddenly saw a danger they had not anticipated. If they marched under the banner of the Nana, then all their work to keep the Contingent together would have been for nothing. Although they managed to send the vakils off, it was only a matter of time before the Gwalior Contingent would have to march. Their objective, however, was no longer Agra – it was Cawnpore. Scindia realised he would have to let them go, and their own leaders, increasingly pressurised by the impatient sepoys, slowly fell in line with the wishes of their men.
On the 20th of September, Delhi fell and was once again in the hands of the British. Less than a month later, the Indore and Mhow rebels were trounced in open battle by Colonel Greathed’s column at Agra, which added strength to Scindia’s position. What Scindia and the Dewan had managed to do was to keep 16’000 men with ample artillery and magazines out of the field for a full four months. Yet the Gwalior Contingent could no longer be stopped. Tantia Tope had done his work too well.

Tantia Tope, the Penultimate Rebel

Born in 1814 as Ramachandra Panduranga Yawalkar in Yeola (near Nasik, or in the village of Gola, in Maharashtra, depending on who you read!), Tantia took on the title Tope, meaning commanding officer and to aggrandise himself just a little more, his adopted first name Tantia means General. He was a personal adherent of Nana Sahib of Bithur and, as such, is considered one of the main instigators of the Satichaura Ghat Massacre at Cawnpore. Besides this particular butchery to his name, Tantia Tope is widely considered one of the best and most effective rebel generals during the mutiny.
He had been actively sowing dissent within the Gwalior Contingent for months, but he saw his main obstacle to winning over the Contingent and ultimately Gwalior was Scindia and the Dewan, however, he had no real means of removing them without provoking Scindia’s troops. Instead, he concentrated his efforts on the Contingent, and when they finally broke free of Scindia, he knew he could march them anywhere he wanted. His objective was Cawnpore, but first, he would teach Scindia a lesson.
On the 15th of October, the Gwalior Contingent rose and, in one body, just as their leaders had hoped, marched towards Cawnpore. As they left Gwalior, they cut down all the trees in the Morar Cantonments, destroyed the country that lay on their route of march and declared Scindia their greatest enemy. They took possession of Jalaun and Kuebwahagar in the Nana’s name, extorted money from the Chief of Gursarai by destroying his son’s eyes with boiling oil and then left detachments in Jalaun and Kalpi, if nothing else, to remind Scindia they were not really gone. The Contingent crossed the Jamuna on the 15th of November and reached Cawnpore on the 1st of December. Along the way, they were reinforced by rebels from Oudh and Banda.

The Gwalior Contingent Falls

The Gwalior Contingent itself was on the road to destruction. On the 28th of November, they signally trounced General Windham at Cawnpore and briefly reoccupied the station with the other rebels, under Tope’s command. It was the only time a rebel army managed to defeat an English force of matching strength in an open battle. It proved that their leadership after the removal of the English officers from Gwalior was strong and, above all, competent and battle-ready. Even after their fight on the 6th of December against Sir Colin Campbell, the Gwalior Contingent withdrew in formation and managed to carry with it the majority of its artillery. Until then, they had kept up carefully their English equipment and organisation; the words of command for drill and rounds were given as the British could hear, at night, in English. They were the only rebel force,  “the formation of which can be said to go beyond that of companies as they had been officered by natives almost exclusively and thus with their field officers and captains, retained something like organised battalions.” After their defeat by Campbell, however, the Gwalior Contingent was no longer able to hold its own. Tantia Tope shifted his headquarters back to Kalpi to join forces with Rani Lakshmi Bai and lead a revolt in Bundelkhand. The job of the British forces was made easier as independent princes started raising their own levies and warred and squabbled openly with each other, while the Gwalior Contingent had lost much of its menace, and instead of the brilliant fighting force they could have been, their back was broken.
Unfortunately, Cawnpore was also the last time they would be able to prove themselves. A subsequent disorganised rout of the rebels from Kalpi in May 1858 (where Tope was not present) showed they were no longer under the control of their own able leaders, and the powerful rebel figures were showing their inability to lead an army. The Rani of Jhansi did not use the Contingent to its full potential, relying instead on her Valiyatis and chosen troops: in her ineptitude, she wasted the sepoys who had shown her their loyalty, and destroyed the cohesion of the Contingent, who could not fight as a rabble. The British had rightly feared the Gwalior Contingent, but the state it was reduced to was hardly worth a footnote anymore. Their end would finally come when their remnants returned to Gwalior.


^{Sources:
Forrest, George W., ed. Selections from the Letters, Despatches and Other State Papers Preserved in the Military Department of the Government of India, 1857-58. Vol. IV, Jhansi, Calpee, Gwalior. Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing India, 1912.
Intelligence Branch, comp. The Revolt in Central India 1857-59. Simla: Government Monotype Press, 1908.
Luard, C. E., and Dwarka Nath Sheopuri, comps. Gwalior State Gazetteer. Vol. I, Text and Tables. Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, India, 1908.
Macpherson, Samuel Charters. Memorials of Service in India: From the Correspondence of the Late Major Samuel Charters Macpherson, C.B. Edited by William Macpherson. London: John Murray, 1865.
Thornton, Thomas Henry. General Sir Richard Meade and the Feudatory States of Central and Southern India: A Record of Forty-Three Years of Service. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898.}

---